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I. Introduction 
In much of the developing world, unemployment among the youth is extremely high: 
youths (ages 16-24) comprise 40 percent of the world’s unemployed while accounting for only 
17 percent of the world’s population (United Nations, 2012; ILOSTAT, 2017). High 
unemployment is not only related to high poverty but also has a strong influence on other 
important social outcomes: it impacts crime rates (Blattman and Annan, 2016; Fella and 
Gallipoli, 2014), depression prevalence (Frese and Mohr, 1987), substance abuse rates (Linn et 
al., 1985), and rates of social exclusion (Goldsmith et al., 1997). Moreover, the low labor force 
participation of women is particularly pronounced in many regions of the world, resulting in 
female-specific consequences of unemployment and underemployment, such as low decision-
making power in the household and domestic abuse (Majlesi, 2016; Lenze and Klasen, 2016). 
Therefore, targeting youth unemployment with effective interventions, specifically taking female 
needs into account, is one of the highest priorities for low-income countries (World Bank, 2013). 
Although there are numerous determinants for high levels of unemployment and poverty, lack of 
skills is arguably one of the most important (Heckman et al., 2004; Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 
2010). One common policy response in an effort to enhance skill formation among the youth is 
vocational training programs. To date, more than 700 youth employment programs from 100 
countries have been implemented, and more than 80 percent of them offer skills training.1  
In this paper, we examine one of the largest youth training interventions in Nepal, which 
serves almost 15,000 poor and disadvantaged young men and women annually by subsidizing 
skills training and employment placement services. Despite the rapid expansion of skill-
enhancement programs across the world, this study is among the few to rigorously evaluate such 
a program in a low-income country. Youth employment rates (other than in subsistence 
agriculture and informal activities) are exceptionally low in Nepal. In particular, women face 
difficulties entering the non-farm sector or finding paid employment. In combination with a 
comprehensive advertisement strategy the training program was created to specifically target 
young Nepali women.  
We examine the program’s labor market outcomes based on quasi-experimental techniques. 
We use a large panel data set of three consecutive cohorts of applicants to the program. Program 
eligibility was based on individual scores determined by a standardized application procedure 
                                                            
1 See Youth Employment Inventory (http://www.youth-employment-inventory.org/) 
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and a course-based threshold score. Therefore, we exploit the individual-assignment scores to 
implement a regression discontinuity design. Because we find some evidence that the actual 
individual assigned score was manipulated in practice, we instead use application-form data to 
reconstruct the underlying score components and generate our own individual-based score. We 
then use the reconstructed forcing variable as an instrument for training to estimate the program 
impacts on compliers (LATE estimates) and as a treatment variable to estimate the programs 
intent-to-treat (ITT) effects.  
We report three major findings. First, approximately twelve months after the start of the 
training program, the intervention generated an increase in non-farm employment of at least 10 
percentage points (based on ITT estimates) and up to 31 percentage points for compliers (based 
on LATE estimates), both of which are heavily driven by women starting self-employment 
activities inside (but not outside) their homes. The program also generated an average monthly 
earnings gain of at least 659 NRs (9 USD) (based on ITT estimates) and up to 2,113 NRs (28 
USD) (based on LATE estimates) for women. Second, in contrast to women, men do not 
significantly gain from the program along the extensive margin of non-farm employment in the 
short run but do show an increase in earnings conditional on any employment of at least 698 
NRs, which suggests that they use the program to upgrade their skills. Third, using a small sub-
sample of the initial study population, we find suggestive evidence that 24 months after the start 
of the program, men have gained along the extensive margin with an increased non-farm (self)-
employment rate of at least 19 percentage points, while female medium-term employment and 
earnings effects stay in a similar range compared to the short-term effects but, possibly due to the 
lower statistical power, turn insignificant.2 
Our program impacts stand in stark contrast to the vocational training literature from middle-
income countries as these studies generally find small or no effects (McKenzie, 2017). We 
highlight three explanations of this discrepancy and how they relate to the low-income country 
context of our study. First, differences in baseline educational attainment suggest that the 
magnitude of program effects might be very different in low-income countries than those found 
                                                            
2 The increase in effect sizes from the short- to medium-term is in line with results of other studies: Lechner et al. (2011) find average treatment 
effects on the treated in the form of increased employment rates of 10–20 percentage points in West Germany. Also see Kluve (2010), Card et al. 
(2010), and Ibarraran (2015) who find evidence of larger medium-term effects. 
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in middle-income countries.3 High poverty rates often go hand-in-hand with low educational 
levels and, to the best of our knowledge, the baseline educational levels in our study sample are 
the lowest among the existing experimental and quasi-experimental literature.4 Low baseline 
human capital implies a relatively steeper increase in output (and earnings). This relationship 
between low human capital and large marginal increases in earnings may be further pronounced 
if gender inequality in educational attainment is high (see, e.g., Knowles et al., 2002; Klasen, 
2002).  
Second, the measurement of outcome categories can also account for differences between 
results in middle-income and low-income countries. Low-income countries without 
institutionalized unemployment insurance are often characterized by a large agricultural and 
informal sector. The majority of individuals are involved in either subsistence agriculture or 
informal small-scale businesses as formal employment activities are unavailable (Nayar, 2011). 
Therefore, unemployment, as it is known in high-income countries, is relatively rare, whereas 
underemployment is very widespread. Comparing effect sizes between low-income and middle- 
or high-income countries is further complicated by the fact that the program impacts found 
within the existing literature in middle-income countries is gauged by any employment or formal 
versus non-formal employment.5 However, both of these criteria are generally not useful in 
analyzing low-income country samples.6 Vocational training in a low-income country is unlikely 
to yield large employment effects on the extensive margin or on formal employment rates, but 
can generate large impacts on the intensive margin (hours worked) and on changes in sectorial 
composition of employment (farm versus informal non-farm employment), which is indeed the 
case in our study. Our estimated ITT impacts on the probability of any employment (4 percent, 
insignificant) or wage-employment (3 percent, insignificant) are in fact in line or smaller than the 
                                                            
3 Betcherman et al. (2007) review findings from vocational programs around the world. The authors posit that programs from middle-income 
countries are generally more effective than programs from high-income countries, thereby suggesting that program effects may be even larger for 
vocational training in low-income countries. 
4 Based on the program eligibility criteria, very few of the participants had completed higher than a 10th grade education (approximately 12 percent) 
and a total of 38 percent of individuals in our sample had only primary education or no education. This is dissimilar to other studies from middle- 
and low-income countries. For instance, Card et al. (2011) report an average of about nine years of schooling at baseline. Alzua et al. (2016) report 
that only 11 percent of the sample had primary education or lower, while 57 percent of the sample had completed secondary schooling or more. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2015) report, on average, eleven years of schooling at baseline. Maitra and Mani (2017) report that 45 percent of their sample had 
completed secondary education at baseline. Adoho et al. (2014) report 46 percent of their sample had attained an education level of 10th grade or 
above. 
5 Formal employment is often defined as paid employment that is based on a formal contract and possibly comes with social security benefits like 
health care, pension, and/or injury compensation, etc. (see e.g. Attanasio et al., 2011).  
6 In our study, individuals employed in the formal sector make up only 1.5 percent of our sample at baseline and 2.5 at follow-up. In Adoho et al. 
(2014), conducted in Liberia, only five to six percent of the sample is wage-employed at baseline, while formal employment is virtually non-
existent. In contrast to these findings, Attanasio et al. (2011) report that in their sample, 7 and 12 percent of women and men at baseline are active 
in the formal sector, respectively; at the follow-up stage, these numbers are 23 and 38 percent for women and men, respectively. Hirshleifer et al. 
(2015) detect a share of 30 to 43 percent formally employed participants in the control group. 
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coefficients on wage-employment found in middle-income countries: for example, Attanasio et 
al. (2011), Card et al. (2011), and Reis (2015) find coefficients that range between 0 and 8 
percent.7 In contrast, our large effects on the probability of self-employment seem unique to the 
low-income country context. The few studies from middle-income countries that measure 
entrepreneurial activities usually find no impact on the probability of self-employment or on self-
employment earnings (e.g., Attanasio et al., 2011; Maitra and Mani, 2017).  
Third, the fact that the impacts we detect operate mainly through female self-employment 
inside but not outside the house points to an important dimension in how effect channels may 
differ across countries: social and cultural norms surrounding work. In traditional societies, 
women may be more confined by gender roles that constrain their involvement in the labor 
market. Restrictive norms regarding female labor force participation exist in many regions of the 
world, but they seem to be particularly strong for women in South Asia (World Bank, 2011; 
Asian Development Bank, 2015; Booth, 2016).8 Our results suggest that the program enables 
otherwise underemployed women to earn an income while staying at home – close to household 
errands and in line with the socio-cultural norms that prevent them from taking up employment 
outside the house. Further, certain ethnicities or castes may face obstacles in utilizing their labor 
market potential as a result of discrimination by employers or lower access to education 
(Banerjee and Knight, 1985; Mainali et al., 2017). If a vocational training program manages to 
unlock this latent potential by taking the unique needs of particularly disadvantaged populations 
into account—as has been done in the program studied here—it might unleash large employment 
and earnings potential, whereas, in the opposite case, a similar program might prove less 
effective (e.g., Cho et al., 2016). 
Our paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature on vocational 
programs in developing countries. First, our paper provides evidence that large program impacts 
of vocational training programs – particularly in the low-income context – are possible, despite 
                                                            
7 Overall, these studies provide skepticism regarding the cost-effectiveness of training programs (Almeida et al., 2012). In contrast, the Liberia 
experiment, mentioned above, cost between $1,200 and $1,650 per beneficiary; although this is relatively high, the returns to self-employment 
training are also sufficiently large to recoup this cost within three years (Adoho et al., 2014). 
8 Only one other quasi-experimental study in South Asia examines the impact of training programs on employment and earnings. Maitra and Mani 
(2017) evaluate a training program in stitching and tailoring offered to young women in New Delhi. They find that program participation increased 
employment by more than 5 percentage points, self-employment by almost 4 percentage points, and any employment by 6 percentage points. The 
program increased number of hours worked by approximately 2.5 hours. However, the smaller effect sizes are based on ITT estimates, which are 
based on much lower compliance rates (56 percent) compared to our study (70 percent). Also, initial levels of wage-employment and education are 
higher in India as Nepalese socio-cultural norms regarding gender roles may be less restrictive in New Delhi compared to rural Nepal where most 
of our courses take place. 
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most of the existing evidence from middle-income countries suggesting otherwise.9,10 Based on 
the experience of middle-income countries, only Maitra and Mani (2017), Reis (2015) and Alzua 
(2016) find positive impacts on the probability of any employment and any earnings in India, 
Brazil, and Argentina, respectively. On the other hand, Honorati (2015), Card et al. (2010), 
Attanasio et al. (2011, 2015), Ibarraran (2015), Hirshleifer et al. (2015), Acevedo et al. (2017), 
Diaz and Rosas (2016), and Galasso et al. (2004) find either mixed, muted, or no impacts at all 
from vocational programs on various labor market outcomes.11 That large effects may be 
particularly pronounced in low-income contexts is confirmed by two studies conducted in 
Liberia and Uganda12: Adoho et al. (2014) randomly assign a similar intervention like the one 
studied here and detect an increase of 47 percent in non-farm employment and 80 percent in 
earnings among young Liberian women. Similarly, Bandiera et al. (2017) find positive impacts 
on income generating activities of 48 percent (which were almost entirely driven by self-
employment), but no positive impacts on wage-employment in Uganda. Our second contribution 
to the existing literature relates to the pattern of different returns to vocational training between 
women and men. Although Blattman and Ralston (2015) point to a stylized fact that proposes 
vocational training has higher returns for women, McKenzie (2017) reviews recent vocational 
training programs in low-income and middle-income countries and, in fact, argues that previous 
studies, which formally test for equality by gender, can either not reject similar impacts for men 
and women, or have found significantly higher impacts for men.13 In stark contrast, our study 
does formally test for equality by gender and it unambiguously shows robust evidence that 
vocational training in our context yields higher returns for women. We highlight that our results 
are likely driven by the socio-cultural norms in Nepal, which shape gender roles that identify 
women with more restrictive characteristics and capabilities in the labor market compared to 
other country contexts in the training literature (e.g., Latin America). This exemplifies that 
generalizing heterogeneous impacts of policies such as the one investigated here should (if at all) 
                                                            
9 We use the World Bank income classification of countries from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/CLASS.xls 
10 Most of the vocational training literature on similar programs in high- or middle-income countries finds low or insignificant effects (Card et al., 
2010; Kluve, 2010; Dar and Tzannatos, 1999).  
11 Other authors document similarly sized impacts based on related active labor market policies such as wage subsidies (Galasso et al., 2004; Groh 
et al. 2016; Levinsohn et al., 2014)) or search and matching assistance (Adebe et al., 2016a; Franklin, 2005; Adebe et al., 2016b; Jensen, 2012; 
Groh et al., 2015; Dammert et al., 2015; Beam, 2016; Abel et al., 2016; Bassi and Nansamba, 2017) 
12 Rigorous evidence of one other vocational program based in low-income countries exists: In Malawi, Cho et al. (2016) find no impacts on hours 
worked and no impacts on other employment outcomes. Yet, the authors explain that an unsatisfactory tailoring of the program to the needs of the 
target group in combination with large numbers of drop-outs are likely responsible for the low effects. 
13 To the best of our knowledge, considering the rigorous evidence on vocational training programs, only Alzua et al. (2016) formally test for 
gender-disaggregated effects and find a difference: the authors document larger impacts for men.  
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be done very cautiously, carefully considering the relevant effect channels. Finally, our study 
underscores that measuring a wider range of employment outcomes, such as self-employment, 
may be necessary to comprehensively study the impact of active labor market programs. Even 
though formal employment per se is not affected by the vocational training in our context, we are 
able to identify some short run effects on women's self-employment that less comprehensive 
labor market surveys of previous studies may have missed. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides background 
information on Nepal’s labor market and details Nepal’s Employment Fund training program and 
the intervention design. Section III describes the data, sampling strategy and sample 
characteristics. Section IV presents the study design, and Section V describes the empirical 
strategy. Section VI presents the results, and Section VII provides various robustness checks. 
Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. Background   
A. The Labor Market in Nepal 
Nepal’s economy ranks among the world’s poorest. In 2010, a quarter of the country’s 
population lived below the national poverty threshold. The Nepalese economy is characterized 
by lack of formal sector jobs, a large informal sector, and wide-spread underemployment 
(affecting approximately half of the workers in the younger age groups), all of which contribute 
to very high poverty rates (ILO, 2004; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).14,15 Based on the 
Nepal Labour Force Survey 2008, 74 percent of laborers work in the agricultural sector while 64 
percent work in subsistence agriculture. Women are particularly underrepresented in non-
agricultural employment. Although the Nepal Labour Force Survey 2008 reports a labor force 
participation of women (80.1 percent) that is similar to that of men (87.5 percent), approximately 
three quarters of employed women work in subsistence agriculture (compared to 52.9 percent of 
men), whereas only 26.2 percent are engaged in paid work (compared to 73.9 percent of men). 
                                                            
14 Although no labor survey specifically collects informal sector data, some economic measures point to the size of the informal sector constituting 
more than two-thirds of the economically active population in Nepal (Suwal and Pant, 2009). One of the reasons for Nepal’s bad economy and its 
underdeveloped formal sector is the political turmoil the country experienced in the last two decades: a peace agreement between the government 
and the Maoist insurgency, an interim constitution promulgated in 2007, the 2008 declaration of a democratic republic, new and rising ethnic 
political movements, and a democratically elected Constituent Assembly in 2013. 
15 Nepal’s 2008 labor force survey (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009) shows that 21 percent of the individuals working less than 40 hours per week 
are in fact able to work more and are therefore underemployed. Shortage of employment opportunities has generated a migration flow to urban 
areas and migration to other countries, especially to the Gulf States (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009). Nepal’s net migration has registered an outflow 
of migrants near half a million for the period 2008 to 2012. During the same period, Nepal’s net migration rate has exceeded the same number for 
the overall migration rate of South Asia. 
7 
 
Moreover, monthly earnings of female paid employees are much lower on average (NRs 3,402 
versus 5,721 for men) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). 
 
Low skills and high youth unemployment. The country’s labor market outcomes can, to some 
degree, be attributed to low levels of human capital accumulation. According to the Nepal 
Labour Force Survey 2008, the total literacy rate for individuals of ages 15 years and above is 
55.6 percent (70.7 percent for men and 43.3 for women). Only 22 percent of women and 29 
percent of men have more than a primary education, and approximately half of the Nepalese 
have no formal schooling at all (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). These numbers are 
staggeringly low even in comparison to the human capital indicators of other South Asian 
countries and the rest of the developing world. For instance, in Latin America, where most of the 
available experimental evidence on the effectiveness of training programs in developing 
countries comes from, approximately 75 (50) percent of the population of age 15 (20) or above 
had completed primary (lower secondary) education in 2004 (UNESCO, 2007). Moreover, lack 
of vocational skills is predominant among young Nepalese. Around half a million young people 
join the labor force each year, the vast majority of them being unskilled. Although the market 
demand for skills is high, access to vocational training is limited, particularly among the poor 
and disadvantaged groups.  
Cultural and Social Norms Regarding Female Employment. A combination of low educational 
attainment and restrictive norms towards marriage, childbirth, and household duties generate 
multiple constraints for young women who wish to enter the labor market. These constraints are 
reflected in the different reasons that young men and women report for not participating in the 
labor force: although the majority of economically inactive men between ages 15 and 29 report 
that they are attending school (85.3 percent), only 43.9 percent of women of the same age group 
report school enrollment as their major reason. Instead, 41.6 percent of economically inactive 
women between ages 15 and 29 and even 80.1 percent of women between ages 30 and 44 report 
to be economically inactive because they have to engage in (unpaid) household duties, while 
virtually none of the men in these age groups state household duties as a reason for being absent 
in the labor market (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). 
In addition, being bound to their households and families because of gender roles, women 
also face three broad gender-based employment barriers, which further complicate their 
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economic well-being: restricted mobility, cultural norms, and societal norms regarding gender 
expectations for certain occupations. Largely influenced by Hindu philosophy related to men and 
women’s positions in society, Nepal’s socio-cultural practices differ by caste and ethnicities. For 
example, related to the first employment barrier, in southern Nepal (Terai and Madhesh) women 
are frequently confined to the household and are unable to travel outside of their immediate 
community for any work. Various proscriptions based on the Madhesi culture restrict females 
from leaving their homes. The second gender-related barrier relates to cultural norms that 
prohibit women from interacting with men other than their family members. For example, in 
conservative parts of the Terai districts, females who are trained as barbers are not employed due 
to cultural prohibitions against women touching men. The third gender-based labor market 
barrier relates to women who choose to train and work in traditionally male-dominated 
occupations. In various typically male-dominated occupations – for example, computer and 
television repair, auto body making and construction work – customers frequently express doubts 
regarding the quality of skills of women assigned to such repair jobs. As a result of the societal 
difficulties women face, they remain engaged in unpaid, home-based labor to a large extent. 
Approximately 80 percent of the unpaid family labor force is female (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2009). 
In summary, the low educational levels and the shortage of skill training opportunities 
suggest that the return to obtaining additional training – especially for women – may be 
particularly high in Nepal. With that said, training for women may only be successful if the 
program takes female-specific needs into account so that it can enable them to expand their 
economic activities while adhering to their social roles and the cultural norms of their 
communities.  
 
B. The Nepal Employment Fund 
Started in 2008, the Employment Fund (EF) is one of the largest skills training initiatives in 
Nepal. The program provides vocational training and placement services under a unique 
governance structure in cooperation with local training providers. The EF program subsidizes 
short-term market oriented skill training in combination with other services for disadvantaged 
young women and men. The fund’s objective is to place trainees into gainful employment upon 
training completion. Each year, the EF sponsors about 600 to 700 training courses. The EF-
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subsidized courses are announced publicly in local communities with the intent to encourage 
potential candidates to apply. The applicants are then selected by a standardized procedure based 
on eligibility criteria. Available seats are restricted due to the limited capacity of training 
providers. As of 2010, the program operates at scale nationwide and covers 54 districts, 
providing training for over 65 occupations and has expanded in the consecutive years. Table 1 
provides an overview of the total number of training events, trainees, and training providers for 
the time of our study period (2010-2012).   
 
Program components. Admission to the program offers the trainees a bundle of services, where 
the core components are technical training (including certification) and job-search-assistance. 
Training courses in technical skills vary across a wide range of trades (e.g., incense stick rolling, 
carpentry, tailoring, welding, and masonry) and last from four weeks to three months. Each 
trainee is encouraged to complete a skills certification test offered by the National Skills Testing 
Board (NSTB). Upon completion of the classroom-based training, the EF emphasizes job 
placement services. Once the first training phase is completed, training providers are required to 
link trainees to trade-specific employers for six months of paid on-the-job-training. Providers 
often use their trade-specific networks of trainers and employers to find suitable internships for 
their graduates. Through the internship, trainees obtain immediate work experience as they apply 
their learned skills in the market and, subsequently, strengthen their social capital and contacts 
with potential employers. In addition to the core components of the program, all females receive 
40 hours of life-skills training (started in 2010 and fully implemented in 2011). The forty-hour 
training curriculum covered topics such as negotiation skills, workers’ rights, sexual and 
reproductive health and discrimination response. A subset of trainees also received a short course 
in basic business skills. 
 
Outcome-based payments. Training providers are rewarded for their services in three 
installments based on a set of pre-determined outcomes. A provider qualifies to receive full 
payment – i.e., the full price of the training and services provided plus a bonus based on whether 
the trainee belongs to a vulnerable group – by a set contract between the EF and the training 
provider. The contract stipulates that all accepted trainees must successfully complete their skills 
training and sit for a skills test given by the Nepal National Skills Testing Board (NSTB). When 
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trainees complete the test, providers obtain their first installment (40 percent of total payment). 
Upon the exam completion, providers are expected to ensure that graduates remain continuously 
employed for the next six months and that they earn above 3000 NRs per month (“gainful 
employment”). The EF verifies three months and six months after training completion whether or 
not trainees are gainfully employed. If the verification process is successful, the training provider 
obtains the second and the third installments (25 percent and 35 percent of total payment, 
respectively).16 The cost for training and employment services is pre-financed by the providers 
and is reimbursed to them only when they accomplish the outcomes in their contract. Therefore, 
training providers bear the risk of losing their investment if they are unsuccessful in training and 
placing their trainees accordingly. 
 
Targeting disadvantaged groups. Three factors comprise the eligibility criteria for all EF-
sponsored training programs: age (from 16 to 35), education (below SLC17, or less than ten years 
of formal education) and low self-reported economic status. Only applicants who meet all three 
criteria were viable for being short-listed in the admission procedure. Furthermore, and as 
mentioned above, providers receive a bonus payment for successfully training and placing 
candidates who belong to particular disadvantaged groups.18 The bonus payment is calculated as 
a percentage of the full cost of training and services provided and is issued proportionally 
together with the three installments described above, as long as the particular requirement for 
each installment is fulfilled. A provider receives a bonus payment of 40 percent of the base cost 
of training for a man who is poor and 50 percent for a man who is poor and belongs to a 
disadvantaged group. A provider further receives a bonus payment of 70 percent of the base cost 
of training for a woman who is poor and 80 percent for a woman who is poor and belongs to a 
disadvantaged group.19 
In 2010, the EF, partnering with the World Bank, made additional efforts to specifically 
target young women aged 16 to 24. Training under the Adolescent Girls Employment Initiative 
(AGEI) proceeded in the same way as it did for other EF trainees, except that certain events had 
                                                            
16 Employment status of a randomly selected sample of graduates is verified by EF field monitors. 
17 The School Leaving Certificate (SLC) is obtained after successfully passing examinations after the 10th grade. To be eligible, EF applicants must 
have not taken, or not passed, their SLC exams. This criterion has been loosened for some trades starting in 2012. 
18 Disadvantaged groups are defined by the EF as people belonging to the Dalit community, ex-combatants, internally displaced, widows (only 
women), disabled, HIV/AIDS infected, and formerly bonded laborers. 
19 Poverty is defined as less than six months of food sufficiency for farm households or less than 3,000 per capita family income, from non-farm 
based income. 
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been flagged in advance as likely to attract female trainees. In addition to regular training course 
advertisement, the EF sponsored radio and newspaper ads specifically geared towards young 
women. Many of these ads specifically encouraged women to sign up for traditionally male 
trades, such as mobile phone repair, electronics, or construction. 
 
III. Data 
A. Sampling 
We used two primary sources of data. First, we used data from training application forms 
and the selection procedure of EF-sponsored training that covered three consecutive cohorts of 
applicants (from 2010 to 2012). Second, we conducted individual (applicant) and household 
surveys with two rounds of data collection for each cohort. For the 2010 cohort, a second follow-
up was conducted on half of the cohort.  Figure 1 shows the survey timeline.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Sampling into this study included a combination of stratified, random, and convenience 
sampling and was done in two consecutive steps. For each cohort, the first step consisted of a 
selection of training events, and the second step consisted of selecting individuals according to 
standardized procedures. The event sampling-frame for this study consisted of all training events 
from the universe of the EF funded trainings that occurred between January and April of each 
year. Events were grouped into clusters of close-by districts before sampling for survey 
administrative reasons. We then randomly sampled up to 15 district clusters in each of the three 
years, respectively. Furthermore, from the list of training events that took place in these district 
clusters, we randomly selected 20 percent. Because of the focus on young women in this study, 
events that were likely to include more young women (identified by training providers) were 
purposely oversampled in 2011 and 2012. In 2010, because a complete event listing was not 
available in advance, the events were not chosen randomly but by convenience, based on 
scheduling and accessibility. Table 1 details the resultant sample of events for the three cohorts. 
 
[Table 1 about here]   
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The 2010 sample comprised 65 events across 12 districts. The 2011 sample comprised 182 
events, of which 113 events were dropped from the baseline survey, either because the survey 
team could not reach the event on the day of applicant selection (usually due to weather 
conditions) or because the event was not “oversubscribed”.20 The remaining 69 events in 28 
districts were included in the 2011 baseline sample. In 2012, 85 out of 112 sampled events 
covering 26 districts were included in the study sample. Figure 2 depicts the study areas by 
survey. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
To sample applicants, a survey team visited each sampled training event on the day when 
applicant selection happened. The sampling of applicants was based on the standardized 
interview procedure that was used to determine training assignments. During the assignment 
procedure (which we will describe in more detail below), applicants received scores in five 
different categories that were added up to form a total score. A ranking sheet was then used to 
list applicants from the top scorer to the bottom scorer and indicated the threshold (i.e., minimum 
score) for admission to the course. The individuals we study comprise a subset of the ranked 
individuals -- those who fell in the range of 20 percent below or above the threshold. 
Immediately following the sampling of applicants but before the results of the selection process 
were announced, a baseline survey was administered. 
 
[Table 2 about here]   
 
The sampling procedures resulted in a study sample of 4,677 individuals across all three 
cohorts at baseline, see Table 2. For the first follow-up surveys, we were able to track and 
successfully interview 88 percent of the baseline survey respondents, yielding a panel for 
analysis of 4,101 individuals.21 Because training courses vary in length from one to three 
                                                            
20 Oversubscription was necessary to obtain a sufficiently large “quasi”-experimental control group as detailed in the description of the applicant 
sampling below. The survey team was instructed to drop the event from the sample if there were not at least three rejected candidates who could 
be sampled for the control group (i.e., at least three candidates that fell within 20 percent of the threshold score). 
21 The reasons given for loss to follow-up for the 2010 and 2011 cohorts include: inability to track the household (11 percent), no one in the 
household during multiple visits (15 percent), refusal (8 percent), respondent migrated for work within Nepal or abroad (8 percent), respondent 
migrated after marriage (10 percent), or other (40 percent). 
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months, the follow-up survey examines outcomes nine to eleven months after the end of the 
training. The EF itself conducts follow-ups with a sample of participants up to six months after 
the training to verify employment and earnings. This is also the time point when providers 
receive their last payment installment. Hence, our first follow-up survey occurs three to five 
months after the training evaluation and the treatment group’s last contact with the program. 
 
B. Sample Characteristics 
We present an overview of baseline characteristics in Table 3. Eligibility to apply for EF-
sponsored training courses was restricted by age, education level, and poverty status; therefore, 
individuals in our sample are on average young, low educated and relatively poor. For the pooled 
sample (i.e., 2010-2012 cohorts), the study population has an average age of 24 years and is 63 
percent female. A total of 38 percent of individuals have either have no education or only 
primary education. Approximately 61 percent of the sample engaged in some income-generating 
activity in the month prior to the survey. When we restrict to non-farm income-generating 
activities, the employment rate falls to 30 percent. The average number of hours worked in the 
month previous to the survey was 69. At baseline, the average monthly earnings were 1,269 NRs 
in the month prior to the survey (equivalent to about 17 USD). This figure appears low as it 
represents the average earnings over the entire study population of 4,677 individuals, including 
those with zero earnings. Earnings conditional on any income generating activity were 2,082 
NRs. Only 18 percent earned more than 3,000 NRs per month, a level deemed to represent 
“gainful” employment. Furthermore, only 18 percent of the sample was already engaged in the 
same trade as the training to which they applied, denoted as “trade-specific income-generating 
activity (IGA)”, indicating that a significant minority of applicants had been looking to upgrade 
existing skills.  
 
[Table 3 about here]   
 
Generally, women have lower paid employment levels and earnings at baseline. Forty-
seven percent of women engage in activities inside the house that yield some income (e.g., self-
employment activities), while only 36 percent of the women engage in paid activities outside the 
house. In contrast, 59 (69) percent of men engage in paid activities inside (outside) the house. 
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Also, men (69 percent) are more likely than women (56 percent) to carry out unpaid work 
outside the house (e.g., helping relatives); however, more women carry out unpaid work inside 
the house (e.g., household chores, child care). Almost all women (94 percent) work in the 
household without pay for at least five hours a week, whereas this is only true for 61 percent of 
men. Furthermore, 55 percent of the women work more than 20 hours per week inside the house 
without pay, which is only true for 12 percent of the men in our sample. 
 
IV. Study Design 
Admission to the program was based on a calculated score for each applicant and coupled 
with a course-specific threshold score. For each course, applicants with scores above the 
threshold were assigned to the training program, whereas applicants whose scores fell below the 
threshold were not assigned to the program. To form a sufficiently large quasi-experimental 
control group, training providers were advised to shortlist at least 50 percent more candidates 
than the number of spaces available in the training event. The assignment procedure followed 
streamlined guidelines, including a detailed scoring rubric, instructions for ranking the 
shortlisted candidates by score, and selecting the top-scoring candidates for admission to the 
program. 
The individual score used in ranking candidates consisted of five sub-scores based on: (a) 
applicants’ trade-specific education (prerequisite, 15 points)22, (b) applicants’ economic status 
(up to 20 points), (c) applicants’ social caste, gender, and special circumstances (up to 25 points), 
(d) development status of applicants’ district of origin (up to 10 points), and (e) a score 
determined by a selection committee during an interview procedure (up to 30 points). Sub-scores 
for the first four components were determined based on the information each applicant provided 
in his or her application form (shown in Figure A1 in Appendix A). The application form lists 
the exact questions upon which the distribution of scores was based. Tables A1 and A2 show 
how these criteria were converted into numeric scores within each of the four categories. Based 
on the aggregated four-component score, candidates were short-listed and invited for an 
interview. The fifth sub-score was determined based on an interview with a three- to five-
                                                            
22Applicants had to fulfill course specific prerequisites (e.g., literacy, certain trade-specific knowledge or experience) to be eligible for the ranking 
procedure. If an applicant did not fulfill these prerequisites, he was then removed from the selection procedure. If applicants fulfilled the 
prerequisites, they then received 15 points as their first score-component. In exceptional cases (approx. 9 percent of the sample) this rule was not 
adhered to, and candidates received 0, 5, or 10 points. 
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member committee comprised of representatives from the training institution and potential 
employers. Moreover, representatives of the survey firm and/or the donor institutions (e.g., EF, 
World Bank, etc.) were usually present to observe the procedure. The selection committee jointly 
decided on the fifth sub-score by assessing the candidate’s commitment, motivation, attitude, 
aptitude, and clear vision for employment and enterprising. Eventually, the selection procedure 
yielded a total score for each individual by summing across the five components. Possible total 
scores ranged from 0 to 100.  
Admission in each course was then based on candidates’ decreasing rank; available seats 
were assigned starting with the top-scorer. Therefore, the threshold in each course was based 
both on the distribution of candidates’ scores and on the number of pre-determined available 
seats. Because the distribution of scores and the number of seats determine the selection process, 
the threshold score varies for each course, something we take into account in the empirical 
strategy described in Section V. Figure A2 displays a sample ranking form used by training 
providers.23 Although eligibility for training, based on the actual score, influenced the likelihood 
of training course enrollment, individual assignment to training was not automatic as it was 
originally envisioned for two main reasons: non-compliance and manipulation of the assignment 
procedure. We discuss the implications of these two factors in the remainder of this section. 
As we examined the compliance with the selection process, we found that approximately 
30 percent of the group assigned to the program did not take-up the training opportunity 
(possibly due to taking up other training or employment opportunities), whereas 32 percent of 
the non-assigned applicants did. These take-up numbers can be explained by a simple process in 
which seats not taken by individuals assigned to training were then given to individuals who 
were not originally assigned to training but rather next in line based on the ranking form. In the 
regression discontinuity estimation setup we use, an important step is to examine whether and 
how the probability of treatment jumped at the threshold. To account for the course-specific 
threshold, we subtract each individual’s assignment score by the course-specific threshold score, 
whereby we obtain a standardized relative score around the cut-off of zero. We then plot the 
probability of treatment against the relative assignment score. Figure 3’s left graph shows the 
results of this procedure. The plot reveals a clear jump in the probability of program participation 
                                                            
23 Data in each column approximately represents the distribution of the respective component in the full sample. In this example, 15 seats were 
available and the score of the 15th ranked person on the list was 73. Hence, in this example, 73 would be the threshold score for this particular 
course.  
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at the cut-off. As expected, the jump is less than one, a fact that we incorporate in the estimation 
strategy we follow. 
 
[Figure 3 about here]   
 
To assess possible manipulation of the admission procedure, we plot the density of the 
relative score (shown in the left graph of Figure 4). The plot reveals discontinuities in the 
distribution of the score around zero, which suggests that candidates’ scores may have been 
manipulated to shift certain individuals across the assignment cut-off. In our scenario, such 
precise manipulation of the score was virtually impossible for candidates themselves, as it would 
have required access to the ranking form after the official selection procedure was completed and 
the course-specific threshold score was determined.24 In contrast, providers may have had the 
opportunity to precisely alter the scores of those candidates who seemed favorable to them.25 
Although the selection committee included several persons from different interest groups and 
was designed to avoid this type of manipulation on a large scale, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that providers were able to manipulate the ranking sheet after the official selection 
procedure was completed. Because possible manipulation of the score can bias our estimates, we 
specifically address this manipulation issue by reconstructing the assignment score, which we 
describe in more detail below. 
[Figure 4 about here]   
 
                                                            
24 Lee and Lemieux (2010) distinguish between precise and imprecise manipulation. While applicants were certainly able to manipulate the 
information they gave in the application form, aiming to raise their score, the forms were filled out long before the course threshold was determined, 
which only happened once all candidates were interviewed, which, as mentioned earlier, occurred after the application forms were submitted to the 
providers. Applicants’ control over their score was therefore imprecise, which is actually what sorts them randomly around the cut-off. It is, 
therefore, not a threat to internal validity and not likely to have caused the discontinuity in our graph (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
25 Based on the above described payment scheme, providers had a motive to select candidates for the program who seem most employable or most 
disadvantaged. Also, favoritism or bribes from otherwise rejected candidates may have played a role in the manipulation. 
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V.  Empirical Strategy 
To estimate program effectiveness on labor market outcomes, we use a non-parametric 
regression discontinuity strategy by running local linear regressions. Specifically, we estimate 
local average treatment effects (LATE) for the people who comply with the assignment status, 
intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, and heterogeneous effects by gender and trade within these two 
frameworks. In the following section, we describe the estimation strategy, the bandwidth 
selection, and how we reconstruct the assignment score.26  
 
A. Treatment Effect Estimators 
Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE). To address imperfect compliance to treatment, we 
employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity set-up similar to the one proposed by Hahn, Todd, and 
Van der Klaauw (2001). We run the following first-stage equation: 
 
 =  +  + 
 +  −  +  −  +   ,  (1)  
 
where the treatment dummy Di indicates whether or not an applicant i has received training, and 
 is the excluded instrument, specifying whether an applicant has been assigned to training (i.e., 
whether the absolute assignment score Xi of the applicant is greater than or equal to the threshold 
score t of the respective course c he or she applied to). Furthermore, the forcing variable 
 −  is the applicant’s relative assignment score (i.e., it is the difference between an 
applicant's absolute assignment score and the threshold score   of the course). The predicted 
values of  are then used to run a second stage equation: 
 
 =  +  +  
 +  −  +  −   +   ,  (2)  
 
where  captures the local average treatment effect or the treatment effect for the compliers, and 
coefficients  and  represent the different slopes of the linear regression line left and right of 
the cut-off, respectively. In both equations, we have added the absolute assignment score as a 
control variable to account for the heterogeneity in the cut-off values across courses.27 It is 
                                                            
26 We follow the practical guidelines for regression discontinuity designs in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
27 Based on suggestions in Cattaneo et al. (2016), we ran a graphical analysis that aggregates courses by the absolute threshold value to fully exploit 
all the information available by our multi-cutoff setup and explore how treatment effects may vary based on this on this (see Figure A3 in Appendix 
18 
 
important to note that the LATE estimate is not necessarily equal to the population average 
treatment effect, as it is based only on those candidates who comply with program assignment. In 
our sample, it is likely that compliers actually have higher returns to additional education 
compared to the average individual, an assumption that we further explain in the results section 
below. We interpret the LATE estimates as the upper bound estimates of the program impacts. 
 
Intent-to-treat effects (ITT). The overall program effect (regardless of compliance) is of policy 
relevance. In an attempt to deal with the issue that the complier population might differ from the 
full sample, we employ an intent-to-treat regression discontinuity set-up in which we treat 
assignment to training as the treatment variable. We estimate the reduced form equation: 
 
 =  +  + 
 +  −  +  −   +   ,   (3)  
 
where Ti is again an indicator that represents whether an applicant has been assigned to training 
or not. The coefficient  can be interpreted as the non-parametric local intention-to-treat effect 
(Lee and Lemieux, 2010) or the effect of training assignment on outcomes. This effect is likely 
lower than the population average treatment effect in our scenario because several candidates in 
the assigned group have not been trained, while several people in the non-assigned group have 
received training—likely biasing the estimate, , towards zero. We, therefore, interpret the ITT 
effects as the lower bound estimates of program impacts. 
 
Heterogeneous local average treatment effects (HLATE). Because treatment heterogeneity has 
important implications for eliciting the mechanisms through which the program operates, we 
estimate heterogeneous local average treatment effects (HLATE) based on the framework 
proposed by Becker et al. (2013). In particular, we estimate a two-stage procedure similar to the 
one described above with a second stage represented by the equation: 
 
 =  +  +  
 +  −  +  −  +  +  +   ,  (4)  
                                                            
A). Unfortunately, our sample size is not large enough to draw robust conclusions from this analysis as the confidence intervals in the graphs are 
relatively large. However, some of the graphs do suggest that the program may have been less effective in courses with relatively higher thresholds 
(i.e., courses that are likely to be located in particularly poor areas or frequented by particularly poor or disadvantaged applicants).  
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where Hi is an indicator for the subgroup. In the first stage, we use the predicted probability of 
training and its interaction with the subgroup indicator as instruments for  and . 
Additionally, we estimate heterogeneous ITT effects by adjusting Equation (3) to include the 
subgroup dummy  and its interaction with the assignment indicator. 
 
B. Determining Bandwidths 
For choosing the optimal bandwidth we follow Ludwig and Miller (2007) who suggest a 
cross-validation procedure to find the optimal balance between precision and bias.28 The cross-
validation procedure chooses relatively large bandwidths in our sample, which in some cases 
include almost all candidates. We provide plots of the cross-validation functions for all our main 
outcomes in Figures A4 and A5 of Appendix A. In a robustness section below, we further 
investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to the choice of bandwidth. 
 
C. Reconstructing the Assignment Score 
In an ideal case, we can examine the effect of training provision on outcomes by using the 
individual scores assigned by the providers during the interview procedure. The discontinuity in 
training assignment induced by the threshold score should theoretically generate an exogenous 
change in the probability of training, holding individual characteristics constant. However, and 
as mentioned previously in Section IV, we have a reason to believe that training providers were 
influencing the assigned scores – possibly in response to the payment structure, which rewarded 
training completion and trainee placement over drop-outs and non-placed trainees. Therefore, 
manipulating the individual scores is likely to be related to unobserved individual characteristics, 
and, therefore, likely to bias the estimates of interest (McCrary, 2008). Which direction this bias 
takes is not obvious. It is likely that applicants who seemed particularly employable were 
favored by providers, in which case our estimates would be upward-biased. On the other hand, it 
is also conceivable that providers favored disadvantaged groups, as successfully training those 
groups was also incentivized with higher final payments. Finally, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that manipulation may have been the result of bribery or favoritism toward friends or 
                                                            
28 We apply the user-written program rdbwselect provided by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to estimate the cross-validation functions 
that determine our bandwidths. 
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relatives in which case the direction of possible bias could go in either direction. To determine 
the size and the direction of the potential bias, we run balancing tests on relevant characteristics 
at the baseline using the LATE and ITT specifications described in Section V. Specifically, we 
examine the balancing of the outcome variable of interest at baseline in response to potentially 
influential characteristics such as age, education, gender, and ethnicity, which are likely to 
determine labor market outcomes. We report these balance tests in Table 3. The difference tests 
reveal that the initial assignment, based on the original scores, does not perform very well in 
balancing relevant covariates or labor market potential at baseline. Assigned individuals are 
more likely to be male, less likely to be of Dalit ethnicity, more likely to have engaged in a non-
farm wage-employment activity in the past month, more likely to have worked more monthly 
hours, and more likely to exhibit higher initial earnings. In accordance with the incentivized 
payment structure, providers seem to have shifted those candidates across the threshold who 
appear to have been more employable. Moreover, given the imbalances of gender and Dalit 
ethnicity, which are in contradiction with the EF incentives to focus training on vulnerable 
groups, it seems possible that providers may have used score manipulation as a risk reduction or 
risk diversification strategy. Overall, we conclude that using the original score will most likely 
bias our results upwards—for the estimation of treatment effects—as a result of its manipulation. 
To overcome this challenge, we follow the approach by Miller et al. (2013) who 
reconstructed the 'actual' individual-specific score from survey data. Currie and Gruber (1996a, 
b), Cutler and Gruber (1996), and Hoxby (2001) also follow this approach. As we cannot exactly 
be sure which of the sub-scores have been subject to manipulation by the training providers, we 
reconstruct all five of them and later aggregate them to obtain a new total score. We use data 
from candidates’ original application forms to assign three out of five sub-scores. As described 
above, this data is necessarily free of precise manipulation, as the forms were filled out long 
before the ranking sheet and the course thresholds were determined. Figure A1 in Appendix A 
shows the section of the application form that contains the relevant applicant information. We 
assign points based on this information as well as the exact scoring rubric used for the original 
score (see Table A1 and A2). 
For the remaining two score components, we follow two different strategies. The first sub-
score refers to the applicants’ trade-specific education and was initially meant to be 15 for all 
short-listed candidates. Usually, if candidates did not fulfill the course-specific education 
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prerequisites, they were not eligible for short-listing and immediately rejected. However, in 
exceptional cases (approximately nine percent of the sample) this criterion was not adhered to 
and instead applicants received 0, 5, or 10 points. We, therefore, reconstruct the first component 
based on an OLS specification that regresses the original first sub-score on candidates’ general 
and course-specific education attainments, each interacted with a set of course dummies. To 
avoid the estimation bias induced by the aforementioned manipulation, we remove all candidates 
from the model who fall within five index scores of the cut-off (where most of the manipulation 
took place).29 We then predict the outcomes (including all candidates) and round them to values 
that are factors of five in order to reflect the original distribution of the first sub-score.  
For the fifth score component, the selection committee was supposed to assess 
employability and non-cognitive qualities of the applicants to rate their overall probability to 
successfully complete the program. If precise manipulation was applied to an applicant’s fifth 
sub-score, it was likely carried out vis-a-vis the sum of the other four sub-scores, which were 
available at the time of the interview. Given the scoring rubric in Table A1, candidates who are 
better educated, less poor, less disadvantaged, and from a more developed district are ranked 
relatively lower, but may have higher potential to be successful in the labor market after training 
completion and, therefore, might be the more interesting candidates for the providers. If this is 
indeed the case, the incentive for manipulation would be positively correlated with the first score 
component and negatively correlated to the following three sub-scores. In other words, the 
higher (lower) the first (second, third, and forth) component-score, the higher the incentive is for 
the provider to secretly add points onto the applicant’s fifth score in order to shift him or her over 
the threshold. In order to substantiate these considerations, we regress the manipulated fifth sub-
score on the first four sub-scores and a set of course dummies. Results are presented in Table A3 
of Appendix A. We find that the first four score components predict the interview score as 
expected (Column 1 and 2). In Column 3 we also add all possible interaction terms created from 
the four sub-scores of the model, which slightly improve its predictive power. Assuming that 
candidates’ commitment and motivation are not (perfectly) correlated with education, being poor 
or being disadvantaged, the residual of this regression should now contain some relevant 
information on the selection committees’ assessments of the candidates’ aptitudes. We, therefore, 
                                                            
29 The treatment effects presented below are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to a number of alternative specifications, including the use of a 
different range of index scores to drop individuals, or adding other baseline characteristics to the model.  
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use the predicted residual of the model in Column 3 to create the fifth component in the 
reconstructed assignment score. 
Because the points in the first four components were originally distributed by factors of 
five, we divide all score components by five to smooth the score and to minimize the heaping at 
multiples of five found in the original score. The final reconstructed score, therefore, ranges from 
0 to 20. 
 
D. Simulating the Assignment Threshold 
The assignment indicator we need for our analysis is not only determined by the individual 
scores, but also by the course-specific threshold score, which is likely to be affected by the 
manipulation of providers as well.30 To construct a valid instrument, we re-estimate the threshold 
scores for each course following the approach proposed by Miller et al. (2013).31 The authors’ 
proposed approach depends on finding the optimal assignment variable based on a simulation 
exercise that maximizes the number of compliers given the reconstructed individual scores in a 
given course. Specifically, for each course, we run a set of simplified first stages similar to the 
one in Equation (1). We subsequently alter the threshold score, used to create the assignment 
dummy variable, , from the lowest to the highest possible value. We then keep the threshold 
rule out of all possible assignment thresholds based on the specification that yields the largest R2 
for the respective course. Based on this optimal threshold, we proceed with calculating a 
reconstructed relative score, which serves as our new forcing variable. 
 
E. Balancing Performance of the Reconstructed Score 
Our empirical approach assumes that no individual characteristics (other than vocational 
training enrollment) that could influence the outcomes of interest vary discontinuously across the 
estimated eligibility thresholds. As a first cut, and to assess whether the reconstruction of the 
score improves the differential sorting around the cut-off, we provide graphical evidence with 
respect to the density of the new forcing variable in Figure 4 (right graph). The density plot is 
significantly improved and does not appear to be discontinuous around the cut-off. We also 
employ the same balancing tests as before, now using the reconstructed score variable. Table 3’s 
                                                            
30 This is the case because the assignment threshold automatically moves with the distribution of the individual scores in each course. 
31 The authors follow Chay et al. (2005). 
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last two columns report the results. The new score successfully removes the imbalances we 
previously detected in all outcome variables as well as in the demographic characteristics at the 
baseline. Consistent with our assumption, estimates are not generally distinguishable from zero, 
except for the variables of age and Dalit ethnicity. In Figures 5 and 6, we present additional 
graphical evidence that outcomes and demographic characteristics are continuous around the cut-
off of the running variable at baseline, except age and primary education. Age, being Dalit, and 
primary education are (practically) time-invariant characteristics in our sample. We, therefore, 
address the remaining unbalancing by following an estimation strategy on differenced outcomes.  
[Figure 5 and 6 about here]   
 
Additionally, we show evidence in Figures 5 and 7 that the subgroup indicators we use to 
estimate heterogeneous treatment effects (i.e., an applicant’s gender and the trade of training) are 
continuous across the threshold. This continuity across the threshold confirms that assignment 
status is not correlated with interaction variables around the cut-off, which is an important 
condition necessary for the estimation of unbiased heterogeneous treatment effects in the 
regression discontinuity setup (Becker et al., 2013). 
 
[Figure 7 about here]   
 
VI. Results 
A. Program Effects on Employment and Earnings 
We now turn our attention to the impact on the combined 2010, 2011 and 2012 samples 
based on the specifications described in Section V. Table 4, Panel A shows the local average 
treatment effects (LATE) estimated from Equations (1) and (2) – i.e., the effects the program had 
considering those individuals who complied with their assignment status – for employment and 
earnings on differenced outcomes using the original score. We find relatively large estimates 
across all outcomes, including significant (conditional) employment effects of 22 to 61 
percentage points, as well as average earning gains of more than 3,000 NRs.  The F-statistics 
(which range from 32 to 67) and the highly significant coefficients of the assignment variable 
() presented in the same panel suggest a strong first stage. However, as pointed out earlier, the 
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estimates are likely to be biased upwards because the possible manipulation of the original score 
variable led to unbalanced individual characteristics and outcome variables at baseline.  
 
[Table 4 about here]   
 
Therefore, in Panel B, we use the reconstructed score, which led to a significantly 
improved covariate balancing. The first stage is very strong with F-statistics ranging from 38 to 
88 and coefficients of the assignment variable () that are statistically significant at the 1-
percent level. Comparing the effect sizes of Panels A and B (first rows, respectively) reveals that 
manipulation resulted in a strong upward bias in almost all outcomes. Using the corrected score, 
we no longer find evidence of a statistically significant impact on the employment rate, measured 
by whether individuals self-report any income-generating activities in the past month (Column 1, 
Panel B). When we restrict attention to employment in all non-farm activities, we find a lower 
but still statistically significant increase (Column 2, Panel B). The rate of participation in non-
farm income-generating activities increases by 31 percentage points (from a base of 29 percent) 
as compared to 52 percentage points from using the manipulated score (Column 2, Panel A). 
Converting the results in percentage change terms, we find that the program increased non-farm 
employment by almost 94 percent. These impacts are not only statistically significant, but they 
are also economically meaningful. Disentangling these impacts into wage- and self-employment 
activities suggests that the effect is strongly driven by self-employment activities. The program 
increased non-farm self-employment by 30 percentage points, whereas we do not detect 
statistically significant impacts on non-farm wage employment rates (Columns 3 and 4, Panel B).  
We also examine the trade-specific income generating activity (IGA) rate – the percent of 
individuals who find employment in the same trade as the training that they applied for – and we 
find impacts of 40 percentage points (Column 5, Panel B). The increase in the employment rate 
within the same occupational fields for which the individuals trained implies that the skills 
trainees acquired in the vocational training part of the program were useful in starting 
employment activities within their respective trades. The EF program also led to improvements 
in the underemployment rate (i.e., cases in which people are working fewer hours than they 
wish). Column 6 of Panel B shows that the EF-sponsored training courses increased hours 
worked in IGAs by 49 hours per month (i.e., a 71 percent increase). 
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When we examine program impacts on monthly earnings using the corrected score, we find 
that effect sizes are about two-thirds of the estimates in Panel A. The reported results still show 
large program impacts (Columns 7 to 10, Panel B). We measure earnings as an individual’s total 
earnings in the past month, including income from all IGAs, but not including unearned 
income.32 We observe a statistically significant increase in monthly earnings for the treatment 
group by 1,754 NRs (≈ 23 USD), from a baseline average of 1,260 NRs. Once we restrict 
earnings only to those individuals who engage in an income generating activity, we detect an 
increase in earnings by 2,025 NRs (≈ 27 USD), from a baseline average of 2,075 NRs. In 
percentage terms, the increases in earnings translate to 140 and 98 percent, respectively. With 
alternative measurements of earnings, we also detect large program impacts. To account for the 
highly skewed nature of earnings distributions, we examine for impacts on logged earnings and 
find very sizable increases. In a third approach, we consider the proportion of participants who 
earned a “decent living.” The EF considers 3,000 NRs per month (≈ 40 USD) as “gainful 
employment” or “being productively employed.” At baseline, only 18 percent of the sample was 
gainfully employed. The EF training program increased this rate by 31 percentage points. 
In Panels A and B, we use differenced outcomes to address the (remaining) disparities in 
participant characteristics we observed at baseline. In addition, the results reported in the 
discussion above are based on individuals who complied with their assignment status and, as a 
result, may differ from individuals in the full sample. In Panel C and D, we examine how altering 
these two features—that of differenced outcomes and the existence of compliers—affect our 
results. When comparing the estimates on differenced outcomes and on outcomes in levels, 
(Panel B versus C) using the reconstructed score, the difference in effect sizes is minor across 
most results. The most important difference we detect is on the variable that captures conditional 
earnings (Column 10, Panel C), which increases by approximately one-third compared to the 
estimate from the differenced outcome in Panel B. While the assigned group is slightly younger 
on average, they are also less likely to be Dalit than the rejected group. Older individuals may 
have been employed in a particular IGA for a longer time or, in general, may have more work 
experience, which is likely to lead to a higher level of earnings. On the other hand, individuals of 
Dalit ethnicity face substantial discrimination in the labor market, which likely makes them earn 
                                                            
32 If an individual did not work for pay in the past month, his/her earnings are recorded as zero. 
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less compared to non-Dalits. The reduced effect size when controlling for time-invariant factors 
suggests that ethnicity outweighs the differences in age.  
Turning to Panel D, we examine the intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, based on Equation (3) in 
Section V. We also provide graphical evidence of these effects in Figure 8.  
 
 [Figure 8 about here]   
 
As expected, we see sizeable differences: all ITT coefficients are substantially lower as 
compared to the LATE estimates. Although the ITT effects are smaller in size, they still indicate 
that training led to a significant increase in non-farm self-employment and trade-specific 
employment of 9 and 13 percentage points, an average increase of 15 hours per month of 
working time as well as an average rise in overall earnings of 572 NRs. The smaller effect sizes 
are to some extent due to the partial crossover between assignment groups (as we document 
above). Therefore, these coefficients can be interpreted as lower-bound estimates of the program 
effects.  
Moreover, compliers in our sample may differ from non-compliers due to Nepal’s labor 
market context, along with the program-specific targeting of particularly disadvantaged groups. 
Although the eligibility criteria of the program automatically exclude better-educated and non-
poor individuals, the sample of applicants is still quite diverse along various characteristics that 
might affect the magnitude of the return an applicant can expect from participation in the 
program: in caste, in gender, in educational attainment, and in baseline intensity of poverty. It is 
entirely possible that the complier-population may be a subgroup of individuals for whom the 
returns to participation are larger than for the overall sample. For example, individuals who 
comply with program assignment may be otherwise unable to secure a self-paid seat in a similar 
program due to extreme poverty or caste- and gender-based discrimination. At the same time, 
these particular groups of applicants likely also have lower baseline educational levels and 
higher returns to additional education as compared to the rest of the sample. Therefore, we 
interpret the complier-based LATE coefficient estimates as upper-bound estimates of the 
program’s effects. 
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B. Gender-Disaggregated Program Effects 
We also examine program impacts disaggregated for men and women (shown in Tables 5 
and 6). The results reveal striking differences in the program’s effectiveness by gender. For all 
outcomes, except for the conditional and unconditional earnings variables, the LATE estimates 
are larger and significantly different for women as compared to men. Except for the earnings 
conditional on employment outcome, none of the effects for males are statistically significant. 
The coefficients are, in fact, negative for most of the outcomes. In contrast, most effects for 
females are statistically significant, except for non-farm wage-employment, and earnings 
conditional on employment. The ITT results paint a similar picture and, additionally, show weak 
evidence of non-farm wage-employment gains for women. In summary, women seem to gain on 
the extensive margin across most outcomes (i.e., employment rates, hours worked, and earnings) 
without significant gains on the intensive margin (i.e., conditional earnings). In comparison, men 
exhibit gains exclusively on the intensive margin. 
[Table 5 about here]   
 
Several factors could explain the differential gender impacts on employment outcomes. 
First, the EF introduced life-skills training for women, in 2010, in all of its training courses. 
Female students overwhelmingly responded positively to the life-skills training, often claiming 
that it was one of their favorite parts of the course. The skills learned and the positive experience 
in this life-skills training may contribute to the increased employment impact for women, which 
is line with the advice from experts in vocational training from around the world who 
increasingly advocate for the inclusion of life-skills in technical training programs.33 Because all 
women received life-skills training, we ultimately cannot disentangle the influence of this 
particular factor from other program elements. Second, men exhibit higher non-farm baseline 
employment than women (49 percent compared to 18 percent for women) and therefore it is 
easier for women to make larger gains on the extensive margin. Third, women face higher labor 
                                                            
33 Acevedo et al. (2017), Adhvaryu et al. (2016), Bandiera et al. (2017), Ibarraran et al. (2014), and Martinez (2011) show significant impacts of 
life-skills interventions on labor market or productivity outcomes; Groh et al. (2012) find significant impacts of life-skills training intervention on 
women outside Jordan’s capital; Ashraf et al. (2017) find significant impacts of a life-skills intervention among adolescent girls on subsequent 
human capital investment decisions in Zambia. In the Dominican Republic, Acevedo et al. (2017) examine the effectiveness of a life-skills 
intervention for men and women and, in fact, find higher effect sizes of the intervention on women. Adhvaryu et al. (2016), Bandiera et al. (2017), 
AGI (2013), USAID (2015), and Katz (2008) provide arguments for inclusion of life-skills (either alone or bundled with vocational training) 
targeting women in developing countries.  
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market barriers as compared to men. We investigate this third potential explanation in Table 6, 
where we examine time allocation decisions by men and women for paid versus unpaid work, 
inside and outside the household, more closely. The results in Table 6 present a compelling 
story: program impacts on employment seem to be strongly driven by women who start self-
employment activities inside the house, whereas unpaid work inside the house, and activities 
outside the house, remain unaffected by the program. These results suggest that the program is 
particularly effective at placing women into income generating activities while they remain at 
home – in this way, they conform to Nepal’s social norms that restrict female mobility and bind 
them to household responsibilities. 
 
[Table 6 about here]   
C. Trade-Wise Program Effects 
We examine program effects by type of trade and we classify training courses into nine 
categories. The most common training categories are: Tailoring/Garment/Textile (e.g., galaicha 
weaving, garment fabrication, hand embroidery, tailoring and dressmaking), 
Construction/Mechanical/Automobile (e.g., arc welding, brick molding, furniture making, motor 
bike service), and Electrical/Electronics/Computer (e.g., electric wiring, computer hardware 
technician, and mobile phone repair). These are followed by trainings related to Food 
preparation/Hospitality skills, Beautician/Barber skills, and Handicraft/Incense making skills. 
Finally, a few events in our sample are related to Farming, Poultry, and Security Guard skills 
training. Table 7 shows the breakdown of courses by trade. Although the EF specifically tried to 
encourage female participation in non-traditionally female trades, most of the training courses 
tended to be heavily gender-segregated. For example, men tended to dominate electronics and 
construction courses, whereas the tailoring, handicraft, and beautician training sessions were 
almost exclusively comprised of women. 
 
[Table 7 about here]   
 
Table 8 examines program impacts for the six most common training categories. Due to the 
low number of courses and participants, we dropped the remaining three categories from the 
analysis. Table 8 shows that the impacts of the skills training program differed markedly by type 
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of trade. Trainings in beautician and tailoring consistently show strong impacts on 
employment—graduates of these training programs are more likely to have any (non-farm) 
employment and are also more likely to be working within the trade for which they were trained. 
Both trades also show large impacts on monthly hours worked and some of the earnings 
indicators. 
 
[Table 8 about here]   
 
For the remaining four trades, we do not detect conclusive, and significant, positive 
impacts. The coefficients of the trainings related to food preparation and hospitality even seem to 
reflect some negative influence of training on labor market outcomes (although these coefficients 
are mostly insignificant). Overall, the results in Tables 8 reveal substantial heterogeneity in 
employment and earning outcomes across the various types of training. The positive, and 
significant, impacts previously discussed are driven almost entirely by two categories of trades: 
beautician training and tailoring, both of which are almost entirely occupied by female trainees, 
which is in line with the large gender-differences in program impacts presented earlier. 
 
VII. Robustness Checks 
Next, we present a number of consistency checks to investigate whether our estimates are 
within a reasonable range. We also provide additional robustness checks to address possible 
identification threats related to attrition issues or specification choices. 
A. Magnitude of Program Impacts  
Second Follow-up. Most of the employment results we find are driven by self-employment 
activities and, hence, they do not seem to be a direct effect of the job-search-assistance 
component of the program. Still, providers could eagerly support trainees even in their 
entrepreneurial efforts in order to secure the last two installments of the EF payments. The EF 
verified placement 3 and 6 months upon training completion and released the final payment 
installment to providers, if and only if, they verified that trainees were in fact engaged in gainful 
employment. Therefore, it is possible that the employment effects we detect 9 to 11 months upon 
completion of training might be a mechanical effect of the program design. To examine this 
hypothesis, we investigate data on a sub-sample of training applicants, for whom a second 
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follow-up survey (21 to 23 months after end of the training) was collected. Approximately half 
of the applicants from the 2010 cohort were randomly selected to participate in this second 
follow-up survey. The survey team tracked and re-interviewed 634 individuals (79.5 percent) 
who were also interviewed at baseline. Using data from the follow up survey, we re-run the 
specifications from Table 4, Panel B and D, as well as the ones presented Tables 5 and 6 on 
medium-term outcomes. Tables 9 and 10 present the results.  
 
[Table 9 about here]   
 
We find that most of the main effect estimates, presented in Table 9’s Panel A and B, are in 
the range of the estimates we found using the first follow-up data for the pooled sample. 
Strikingly, some of the estimates are slightly larger. In particular, we find statistically significant 
estimates for non-farm employment, trade-specific employment, and gainful employment rates 
of 40, 33, and 40 percentage points, respectively, for the compliers (LATE) as well as 16, 14, 
and 16 percentage points, respectively, for the individuals assigned to training based on the 
intent-to-treat approach (ITT). Because the 2010 data do not include information on whether 
non-farm employment is based on wage- or self-employment, we cannot make inferences on 
what drives the results in that dimension. However, when we investigate the medium-term 
disaggregated effects for the 2010 cohort, we find a slightly different pattern in comparison to 
the pattern based on the short-term impacts for the pooled sample. Although the coefficients for 
females are still positive, slightly lower in magnitude, and insignificant (possibly a result of 
reduced statistical power), we now find positive employment effects for men. Specifically, the 
non-farm and trade-specific employment rates for male compliers rise by 50 and 48 percentage 
points, respectively, while the medium-term male ITT effects show an increase of 19 and 18 
percentage points, respectively.  
 
[Table 10 about here]   
 
Program impacts on time-use (reported in Table 10) show negative but insignificant 
coefficient estimates for female paid work outside the house and positive but insignificant 
coefficients for women who perform paid work inside the house. For men, the coefficient 
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estimates of both paid work inside and outside the house are positive but statistically 
insignificant. Although we do not detect statistically significant results, one could cautiously 
interpret them as somewhat suggestive evidence that medium-run employment rates for women, 
and to some extent for men, are also driven by self-employment activities.  
 
EF Verification Data. For verification and monitoring purposes of program outcomes, the EF 
collected information on trainees’ labor market outcomes. We retrieved information on these 
outcomes in aggregated form from four reports published by the EF from 2011 to 2013.34 As 
another robustness check of our results, we compare these aggregated employment and earnings 
data from the EF with the data from our surveys (reported in Table 11).  
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
Based on the aggregated data, the share of trainees employed was 91 percent, six months 
after training completion, for the 2012 graduates. The share of trainees in gainful employment 
(i.e., monthly income > 3,000 NRs) three and six months after completion of training was 
between 79 and 81 percent for the three cohorts. The employment rates, on the other hand, based 
on the self-reported data from our survey, range from 57 to 62 percent (9 to 11 months and 21 to 
23 months after training completion). This comparison suggests that the numbers, based on the 
self-reported survey, are generally lower than those reported in the EF-verified data, which is 
consistent with the fact that providers receive their full payment after the six-month verification 
and that they have no additional incentives to support the job search of trainees. The rates for 
gainful employment are still relatively high among successful trainees at the time of our first and 
second follow-ups. Given that the employment rates at the three- and six-month mark are much 
higher, our estimates seem within a reasonable range. 
In Figure 9, we also compare the earnings numbers based on the EF-verified data with the 
information from our first and second follow-up surveys. Given the growth trajectory of 
gainfully employed trainees’ earnings over the first six months, post-training, the data based on 
the self-reported surveys seems reasonable and consistent with the overall pattern of the growth 
                                                            
34 Data is available from the Employment Fund Annual Reports 2010 to 2012 as well as a tracer study of 2011 EF graduates, retrieved from 
http://www.employmentfund.org.np/category/resources/reports/ on Feb 24, 2018. 
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in earnings. Based both on this robustness check and also on the results from the 2010 cohort’s 
second follow-up, we provide additional evidence consistent with the notion that our estimates 
are plausible.  
 [Figure 9 about here] 
 
B. Differential Attrition 
As in all panel studies, our estimates could be affected by a group-wise differential attrition. 
For instance, if trainees who are not admitted to the course choose to migrate for work abroad 
and if these are the most able and employable candidates of the control group, we would have an 
upward bias in our estimates. Therefore, in Table A4 of Appendix A, we explore the possibility 
of “differential attrition” and show no evidence to support it. Table A4 shows the results of a 
panel-based regression with attrition status as a dependent variable on a set of covariates for both 
the first follow-up (Columns 1 to 4) and the second-follow-up (Columns 5 to 8). All models are 
estimated based on the reconstructed score. In order to avoid the dropping of observations due to 
missing values in the control variables, Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) include indicators that 
respectively flag missing values for each of the control variables. The regression results indicate 
that attrition is not correlated with assignment status in either wave. 
 
C. Alternative Bandwidths 
To investigate the robustness of our results relative to bandwidth choice, we re-estimate our 
main specifications using bandwidths within 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 index scores of the threshold 
based on the reconstructed score. Tables A5 presents the results, showing that overall our 
estimates are relatively stable both in statistical significance and in coefficient magnitude. For 
most outcomes, the magnitudes of the effect sizes increase with lower bandwidth choice. Only 
for non-farm self-employment are the effect sizes reduced by a half in the full sample. However, 
the effects for the female sub-sample are still large, positive, and significant using a bandwidth 
of 3 (ITT: 11, LATE: 36 percentage points, not shown in table) and, although still similar in size, 
they become insignificant at a bandwidth of 2 (ITT: 9, LATE: 32 percentage points, not shown in 
table). 
 
D. Propensity Score Approach 
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As a robustness check for estimates of program impact, we also employ a combination of 
differences-in-differences and a propensity score matching technique (Meyer, 1995).  This 
approach, in the context of training programs, has the potential to purge possible differences 
between observable characteristics for trainees and non-trainees following Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002). The results based on this approach are presented in Appendix B, and they essentially 
confirm the pattern of the analysis using the regression discontinuity setup in the main paper. 
 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Training interventions have been hailed as one potential solution to facilitate youth 
transition to productive employment and higher earnings worldwide. Although previous 
evaluations of training programs, based on observational designs, typically show positive and 
statistically significant impacts of training on the probability of having a job and on labor market 
earnings, recent experimental interventions from middle- and high-income countries find little or 
no impact on employment and modest gains in earnings. Using a regression discontinuity design 
in the context of a large vocational training program in Nepal, we find very large positive and 
statistically significant effects from the training program on female employment, hours worked, 
and earnings. These effects, in particular, are driven by women who engage in non-farm self-
employment activities carried out inside (but not outside) the house. 
In line with the few other existing studies on similar programs in low-income countries, our 
estimates of the employment effects of this training intervention are among the largest for training 
programs around the world. Features of the low-income background, the South Asian context, and 
the specific training intervention likely account for the large program impacts that we find. First, 
our program impacts are likely driven by a lack of alternative employment, skill training 
opportunities, and by extremely low education levels. Both of these phenomena are much more 
pronounced in the context of Nepal when compared with the context of the most recent 
experimental interventions from middle-income countries (i.e., in Latin America), especially so 
for women. 
A second explanation behind the large program impacts relates to the extremely restrictive 
social norms regarding female labor force participation in Nepal. We find large program impacts 
on self-employment, especially inside the home, and these program effects are likely driven by 
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social norms that prevent women from otherwise being active in the labor market. Restrictive 
norms regarding women entering the labor force exist in many regions of the world, but they seem 
to be particularly strong and restrictive for women in South Asia (World Bank, 2011; Asian 
Development Bank, 2015; Booth, 2016). Largely influenced by the Hindu philosophy on women’s 
positions in society, Nepalese women face gender-based employment barriers due to restricted 
mobility, cultural norms, and societal norms as a result of gender expectations for certain 
occupations.  
Finally, the EF training program was designed around employment outcomes such that 
training providers had to complete market assessments to ensure future employability with respect 
to the individually assigned trades. The training program was also bundled along with services, 
such as job placement, life-skills training, and business training, all of which likely also contributed 
to its effectiveness. Perhaps, most importantly, the program was directly tailored to the needs of 
the target population, and training providers were incentivized and closely monitored to 
accomplish their output. 
Our results have important implications for the design and implementation of future training 
interventions in low-income countries. The empirical analysis presented here suggests important 
lessons for the successful modeling of effective labor market interventions where youth and female 
unemployment is a challenge. 
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FIGURE 1: TIMELINE 
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Notes: Baseline interviews were usually conducted a few days or weeks before start of training. Follow-up interviews were conducted approximately 
12 and 24 months after baseline interviews, respectively. Training duration lasts from 1 to 3 months. EF verifies employment status and earnings 
of applicants 3 and 6 months after end of training, i.e., approx. 8 to 6 and 5 to 3 months before the first follow-up survey. *Roughly half of the 
initial sample of the 2010 cohort was randomly selected for the second follow-up survey. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: DISTRICTS COVERED BY COHORT 
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FIGURE 3: PROBABILITY OF PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
 
 
FIGURE 4: DENSITY OF FORCING VARIABLE 
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FIGURE 5: CONTINUITY OF COVARIATES AROUND THE CUT-OFF AT BASELINE 
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FIGURE 6: CONTINUITY OF OUTCOMES AROUND THE CUT-OFF AT BASELINE 
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FIGURE 7: CONTINUITY OF TRADE CHOICES AROUND THE CUT-OFF 
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FIGURE 8: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF INTENT-TO-TREAT RESULTS 
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FIGURE 9: EARNINGS BASED ON SURVEY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA COMPARISION 
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Tables 
TABLE 1: TOTAL AND SAMPLED EF EVENTS 
 2010 2011 2012 Pooled 
All EF events     
# Events conducted by EF (all year) 
# Events conducted by EF (Jan-Apr) 
# Training providers 
# Trainees 
598 
110 
21 
11750 
645 
142 
32 
12869 
711 
143 
35 
14255 
1954 
395 
- 
38874 
     
Sampled EF events     
# Events randomly sampled for baseline survey N/A 182 112 - 
# Events included in baseline survey 65 69 85 219 
   # Districts covered 12 28 26 - 
   # Training providers covered 18 26 28 - 
Notes: More events were sampled than conducted in Jan-Apr 2011 because some events that were scheduled for Jan-
Apr were delayed and did not start on time. 
 
 
TABLE 2: SURVEY RESPONSE RATES 
  Baseline Follow-up Follow-up rate 
2010 cohort   
Above Threshold 1184 1047 88.4% 
Below Threshold 372 330 88.7% 
Total 
 
1556 
 
1377 
 
88.5% 
 
2011 cohort   
Above Threshold 1237 1113 90.0% 
Below Threshold 349 306 87.7% 
Total 
 
1586 
 
1419 
 
89.4% 
 
2012 cohort    
Above Threshold 1044 888 85.1% 
Below Threshold 491 417 84.9% 
Total 1535 1305 85.0% 
    
Pooled cohorts    
Above Threshold 3465 3049 88.0% 
Below Threshold 1212 1053 86.9% 
Total 4677 4101 87.7% 
Notes: The second follow-up survey for the 2010 cohort was conducted on a reduced (randomly selected) 
sample of 800 individuals. Out of those, the survey team was able to interview 634 individuals (79.5 
percent) who were also interviewed at baseline. 
50 
 
 
TABLE 3: BALANCE OF COVARIATES AND OUTCOME VARIABLES AT BASELINE (FULL SAMPLE) 
Variable Baseline Means  Differences (Original Score)  Differences (Reconstructed Score) 
 All Women Men 
Non-
treated Treated 
Non-
assigned Assigned 
 
LATE ITT 
 
LATE ITT 
Demographics                  
Age 24.32 24.66 23.72 24.39 24.27 24.34 24.31  -1.21 (1.53) -0.32 (0.42)  -4.37*** (1.35) -1.39*** (0.41) 
Primary Education or Less (1=Yes) 0.38 0.43 0.29 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.39  -0.16 (0.12) -0.04 (0.03)  -0.12 (0.09) -0.04 (0.03) 
Men (1=Yes) 0.37 0 1 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37  0.38*** (0.14) 0.10*** (0.04)  0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.03) 
Dalit (1=Yes) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08  -0.38*** (0.08) -0.10*** (0.02)  -0.11** (0.06) -0.03* (0.02) 
Janjati (1=Yes) 0.46 0.42 0.51 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.47  0.09 (0.14) 0.02 (0.04)  0.04 (0.11) 0.02 (0.03) 
Muslim (1=Yes) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03  0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01)  0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01) 
Outcome Variables                  
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.61 0.52 0.77 0.59 0.63 0.59 0.62  0.11 (0.12) 0.03 (0.03)  -0.04 (0.10) -0.01 (0.03) 
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.30 0.19 0.47 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.31  0.20* (0.10) 0.05* (0.03)  -0.03 (0.09) -0.01 (0.03) 
Non-farm wage IGA (1=Yes) 0.19 0.08 0.39 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.20  0.25** (0.12) 0.07** (0.03)  0.07 (0.09) 0.02 (0.03) 
Non-farm self IGA (1=Yes) 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10  0.07 (0.09) 0.02 (0.02)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.01 (0.02) 
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.19  0.11 (0.09) 0.03 (0.03)  -0.11 (0.08) -0.04 (0.02) 
Hours worked in past month 69.26 47 108 66 71 63 72  40** (19) 11** (5)  -1 (18) -0 (6) 
Earnings 1269 770 2138 1254 1280 1180 1303  851* (512) 221 (140)  -44 (407) -13 (128) 
Logged earnings 3.29 2.43 4.80 3.15 3.39 3.03 3.39  1.37 (0.96) 0.36 (0.26)  0.15 (0.73) 0.05 (0.23) 
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) 0.18 0.10 0.34 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.19  0.16* (0.09) 0.04* (0.02)  0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.02) 
Earnings, conditional on any IGA 2082 1491 2774 2127 2054 2009 2109  943 (735) 256 (209)  201 (608) 57 (190) 
Hours/week working ...                  
Unpaid, inside house  > 5 (1=Yes) 0.82 0.94 0.61 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.83  0.04 (0.10) 0.01 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.06) -0.01 (0.02) 
Unpaid, inside house > 10 (1=Yes) 0.63 0.82 0.31 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.65  -0.00 (0.13) -0.00 (0.04)  -0.10 (0.09) -0.03 (0.03) 
Unpaid, inside house > 20 (1=Yes) 0.39 0.55 0.12 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.4  -0.13 (0.11) -0.03 (0.03)  -0.09 (0.09) -0.03 (0.03) 
Unpaid, outside house > 0 (1=Yes) 0.61 0.56 0.69 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.61  0.18 (0.12) 0.05* (0.03)  0.07 (0.09) 0.02 (0.03) 
Paid, inside house > 0 (1=Yes) 0.52 0.47 0.59 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52  0.04 (0.12) 0.01 (0.03)  -0.15 (0.10) -0.05 (0.03) 
Paid, outside house > 0 (1=Yes) 0.48 0.36 0.69 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.49  0.04 (0.12) 0.01 (0.03)  0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.03) 
Notes: Non-farm wage IGA and Non-farm self IGA are only available for 2011 and 2012 cohorts. 
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TABLE 4: EMPLOYMENT 
 
Any IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Any non-
farm 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm 
wage 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm self 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Trade-
specific 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Hours 
worked 
in past 
month Earnings 
Logged 
earnings 
Earnings 
> 3000 
NRs.  
(1=Yes) 
Earnings, 
condition
al on any 
IGA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A           
LATE, DD 0.27* 0.52*** 0.38*** 0.22* 0.61*** 75.92*** 3074*** 2.85* 0.43*** 3179** 
(Original Score) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (25.57) (987) (1.55) (0.14) (1295) 
First Stage 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
F-statistic 67.30 54.90 47.53 47.53 58.42 67.30 53.73 36.04 52.31 32.37 
Baseline mean 0.61 0.30 0.19 0.09 0.18 69.26 1271 3.27 0.18 2084 
Bandwidth 37 15 37 37 19 37 23 12 19 26 
Observations 4080 3976 2677 2677 4066 4080 3899 3544 3891 1979 
Panel B           
LATE, DD 0.13 0.31*** 0.11 0.30** 0.40*** 48.85** 1754** 1.75** 0.31*** 2025* 
(Reconstr. Sc.) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (20.50) (696) (0.87) (0.11) (1115) 
First Stage 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.30***  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
F-statistic 87.47 87.47 54.84 51.12 87.47 87.47 85.92 86.33 86.33 38.23 
Baseline mean 0.61 0.29 0.18 0.09 0.18 68.62 1260 3.27 0.18 2075 
Bandwidth 12 12 12 11 12 12 9 12 12 12 
Observations 4004 4004 2608 2606 4004 4004 3822 3838 3838 1931 
Panel C           
LATE, Level 0.09 0.33*** 0.17 0.26** 0.33*** 48.08** 1934*** 1.80** 0.32*** 2686** 
(Reconstr. Sc.) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (21.01) (745) (0.81) (0.10) (1355) 
First Stage 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.29***  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
F-statistic 87.47 88.14 57.61 35.82 88.14 87.47 89.99 88.26 88.26 29.78 
Baseline mean 0.61 0.29 0.18 0.08 0.18 68.62 1261 3.27 0.18 2043 
Bandwidth 12 8 12 4 8 12 8 12 12 3 
Observations 4004 3976 2633 2164 3976 4004 3836 3864 3864 2110 
Panel D           
ITT, DD 0.04 0.10*** 0.03 0.09** 0.13*** 15.41** 572** 0.57** 0.10*** 598* 
(Reconst. Sc.) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (6.45) (227) (0.28) (0.03) (324) 
Group means at follow-up  (Within given Bandwidth of Panel B) 
Non-treated 0.69 0.46 0.28 0.16 0.30 98.36 2820 4.54 0.40 4157 
Treated 0.81 0.68 0.38 0.29 0.55 132.79 3780 6.13 0.57 4717 
Non-assigned  0.72 0.53 0.31 0.19 0.37 107.78 3035 4.96 0.43 4262 
Assigned  0.79 0.64 0.36 0.27 0.50 126.56 3634 5.84 0.55 4665 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Each cell represents an estimate from a separate regression, 
which includes the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the relative score with the assignment variable as 
counterfactuals, as well as a constant. For comparability, Panel D estimates and follow-up means are conducted within the same bandwidths as in 
Panel B. Assigned/Non-assigned group means are based on the reconstructed score. Non-farm wage IGA and Non-farm self IGA are only available 
for 2011 and 2012 cohorts. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 5: EMPLOYMENT BY GENDER 
 
Any IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Any non-
farm 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm 
wage 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm self 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Trade-
specific 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Hours 
worked 
in past 
month Earnings 
Logged 
earnings 
Earnings 
> 3000 
NRs.  
(1=Yes) 
Earnings, 
condition
al on any 
IGA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: HLATE, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
Women 0.26* 0.53*** 0.21 0.46*** 0.54*** 90.43*** 2113*** 3.51*** 0.52*** 1590  
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (24.67) (784) (1.11) (0.13) (1256) 
Men -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 0.03 0.18 -18.63 977 -1.20 -0.04 2461*  
(0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (27.33) (1028) (1.10) (0.14) (1470) 
Difference 0.35** 0.56*** 0.32* 0.43** 0.36* 109.1*** 1136 4.71*** 0.56*** -871 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (30.65) (1143) (1.40) (0.17) (1560) 
Bandwidth 12 12 12 11 12 12 9 12 12 12 
Observations 4004 4004 2608 2606 4004 4004 3822 3838 3838 1931 
Group means at Baseline  (Within a given Bandwidth) 
Women 0.52 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.11 46.94 770 2.43 0.10 1492 
Men 0.77 0.47 0.38 0.09 0.29 106.90 2130 4.77 0.34 2778 
Panel B: Heterogeneous ITT, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
Women 0.08* 0.16*** 0.07* 0.14*** 0.16*** 27.15*** 659*** 1.06*** 0.16*** 488  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (7.01) (242) (0.33) (0.04) (381) 
Men -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.07 -1.88 386 -0.20 0.01 698*  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (8.10) (310) (0.32) (0.04) (392) 
Difference 0.09** 0.15*** 0.09* 0.12** 0.09 29.03*** 273 1.25*** 0.15*** -210 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (8.01) (313) (0.37) (0.04) (420) 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Panel A presents second stage results. In both panels, each cell 
represents a treatment effect retrieved from a regression, which includes the group variable, an interaction term of the group variable with the training 
or assignment indicator, the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the relative score with the assignment variable as 
counterfactuals, as well as a constant. Difference is the coefficient of the interaction term with the group variable from the respective regression. 
For comparability, all estimates are conducted within the same bandwidths as in Panel B, Table 4. Non-farm wage IGA and Non-farm self IGA are 
only available for 2011 and 2012 cohorts. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 6: TIME USE BY GENDER 
 Hours/week working: 
  
Unpaid, inside 
house  > 5 
(1=Yes) 
Unpaid, inside 
house > 10 
(1=Yes) 
Unpaid, inside 
house > 20 
(1=Yes) 
Unpaid, outside 
house > 0 
(1=Yes) 
Paid, inside 
house > 0 
(1=Yes) 
Paid, outside 
house > 0 
(1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: HLATE, DD (Reconstructed Score)         
Women -0.13 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.42*** 0.07  
(0.09) (0.12) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) 
Men 0.04 0.02 0.15 -0.11 0.08 -0.08  
(0.16) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) 
Difference -0.17 -0.14 -0.06 0.15 0.34 0.16  
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.16) 
Bandwidth 12 12 2 12 12 12 
Observations 4003 4003 2133 4000 4004 4002 
Group means at Baseline (Within a Given Bandwidth) 
Women 0.94 0.82 0.60 0.56 0.47 0.36 
Men 0.61 0.32 0.11 0.70 0.59 0.69 
    
Panel B: Heterogeneous ITT, DD (Reconstructed Score)       
Women -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.13*** 0.02  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
Men 0.01 -0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.02  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Difference -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Panel A presents second stage results. In both panels, each cell 
represents a treatment effect retrieved from a regression, which includes the group variable, an interaction term of the group variable with the 
training or assignment indicator, the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the relative score with the assignment 
variable as counterfactuals, as well as a constant. Difference is the coefficient of the interaction term with the group variable from the respective 
regression. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7: TYPES OF TRAINING 
  By Event 
  
By Applicant 
Female 
Applicants 
  Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent Percent 
Farming 5 2   92 2 88 
Poultry 2 1   41 1 100 
Food Prep/Hospitality 16 7   260 6 54 
Electrical/Electronics/Computer 37 17   639 16 18 
Handicraft & Incense 12 5   233 6 89 
Construction/Mechanical/Automobile 63 29   1127 27 30 
Beautician /Barber 11 5   239 6 100 
Tailoring/Garment/Textile 72 33   1457 36 98 
Security Guard 1 0   13 0 100 
Total 219 100   4101 100  
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TABLE 8: EMPLOYMENT BY TRADE 
 
Any IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Any non-
farm 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm 
wage 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm self 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Trade-
specific 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Hours 
worked 
in past 
month Earnings 
Logged 
earnings 
Earnings 
> 3000 
NRs.  
(1=Yes) 
Earnings, 
condition
al on any 
IGA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: HLATE, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
Food prep. & -0.34 -0.62 -1.73 1.64*** -0.73 -101.23 -5608 -4.98 -0.43 -156 
Hospitality (0.43) (0.64) (1.14) (0.55) (0.69) (110.95) (4626) (5.22) (0.56) (6068) 
Electrician &  -0.25 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.42*** -48.10 -172 -1.53 -0.06 2028 
Electronics (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (35.92) (1280) (1.39) (0.18) (1644) 
Handicraft &  0.11 -0.58 -0.22 0.25 -1.02 51.40 1150 -2.05 0.18 1715 
Incense stick 
making 
(0.47) (0.57) (0.14) (0.24) (0.80) (56.27) (2666) (3.55) (0.30) (2900) 
Construction &  -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 11.47 139 -1.49 0.00 1716 
Mechanics (0.11) (0.17) (0.21) (0.13) (0.20) (29.32) (1139) (1.27) (0.16) (1407) 
Beautician & 1.08* 1.06* 0.67** 0.34 0.99*** 205.57** 4379 6.63* 0.56** -1391 
Barber (0.65) (0.54) (0.29) (0.29) (0.37) (89.18) (2721) (3.62) (0.27) (4295) 
Weaving, 
Tailoring & 0.38** 0.82*** 0.30* 0.57*** 0.86*** 112.5*** 3572*** 5.70*** 0.75*** 2985* 
Garment Making (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (32.10) (1127) (1.59) (0.19) (1621) 
           
Panel B: Heterogeneous ITT, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
Food prep. & -0.05 -0.09 -0.31*** 0.31 -0.10 -14.68 -924* -0.83 -0.06 -10 
Hospitality (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.20) (0.09) (18.02) (545) (0.82) (0.09) (836) 
Electrician &  -0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.15** -13.52 28 -0.42 -0.01 639 
Electronics (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (11.24) (433) (0.44) (0.06) (524) 
Handicraft &  0.04 -0.12 -0.09 0.10 -0.22* 16.38 424 -0.34 0.07 675 
Incense stick 
making 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (14.99) (629) (0.77) (0.07) (1018) 
Construction &  -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 6.56 526 -0.29 0.02 552 
Mechanics (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (9.25) (347) (0.38) (0.05) (383) 
Beautician & 0.25** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.11 0.25*** 49.38*** 1096* 1.62** 0.15** -366 
Barber (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (18.88) (600) (0.77) (0.06) (1165) 
Weaving, 
Tailoring & 0.11** 0.24*** 0.09* 0.16*** 0.25*** 32.32*** 1043*** 1.64*** 0.22*** 985* 
Garment Making (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (8.09) (304) (0.39) (0.05) (509) 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Panel A presents second stage results. In both panels, each cell 
represents an estimate from a separate regression, which includes the group variable, an interaction term of the group variable with the training or 
assignment indicator, the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the relative score with the assignment variable as 
counterfactuals, as well as a constant. For comparability, all estimates are conducted within the same bandwidths as in Panel B, Table 4. Non-farm 
wage IGA and Non-farm self IGA are only available for 2011 and 2012 cohorts. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 9: EMPLOYMENT, SECOND FOLLOW-UP (2010 COHORT) 
  
Any IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Any non-
farm 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Trade-
specific 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Hours 
worked 
in past 
month Earnings 
Logged 
earnings 
Earnings 
> 3000 
NRs.  
(1=Yes) 
Earnings, 
condition
al on any 
IGA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A         
LATE, DD 0.06 0.40** 0.33** 53.16 1277 0.65 0.40* 903 
(Reconstr. Sc.) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (32.90) (1362) (1.52) (0.23) (1510) 
First Stage 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.47***  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
F-statistic 48.33 48.33 48.33 48.33 42.58 42.58 42.58 36.07 
Baseline mean 0.61 0.31 0.18 81.37 1388 3.63 0.20 2304 
Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Observations 621 621 621 621 590 590 590 336 
         
Panel B         
ITT, DD 0.01 0.16* 0.14** 20.60 459 0.19 0.16* 349 
(Reconst. Sc.) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (14.33) (570) (0.65) (0.09) (726) 
         
Panel C: HLATE, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
Women -0.01 0.30 0.18 32.57 1630 1.12 0.38 1220  
(0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (38.49) (1604) (2.05) (0.27) (1680) 
Men 0.13 0.50* 0.48* 76.71 1087 0.13 0.43 425  
(0.21) (0.28) (0.26) (58.26) (1957) (2.48) (0.35) (2318) 
Difference -0.14 -0.20 -0.29 -44.15 542 0.99 -0.05 795  
(0.32) (0.36) (0.37) (73.76) (2408) (3.38) (0.42) (2578) 
Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Observations 621 621 621 621 590 590 590 336 
Group means at Baseline  (Within a Given Bandwidth) 
Women 0.54 0.22 0.13 60.18 943 2.92 0.12 1736 
Men 0.70 0.45 0.26 113.65 2074 4.73 0.33 2987 
 
Panel D: Heterogeneous ITT, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
Women -0.01 0.13 0.10 15.51 624 0.33 0.16 593  
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (14.54) (623) (0.77) (0.10) (871) 
Men 0.04 0.19* 0.18** 28.63 350 0.03 0.15 157  
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (21.19) (658) (0.83) (0.12) (781) 
Difference -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -13.12 274 0.30 0.01 436 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (20.81) (672) (0.96) (0.12) (854) 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Each cell in Panel A and B represents an estimate 
from a separate regression, which includes the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the relative score 
with the assignment variable as counterfactuals, as well as a constant. Panel C presents second stage results. For comparability, Panel 
B, C, and D estimates are conducted within the same bandwidths as in Panel A. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level. 
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TABLE 10: TIME USE BY GENDER, SECOND FOLLOW-UP (2010 COHORT) 
 Hours/week working: 
  
Unpaid, inside 
house  > 5 
(1=Yes) 
Unpaid, inside 
house > 10 
(1=Yes) 
Unpaid, inside 
house > 20 
(1=Yes) 
Unpaid, outside 
house > 0 
(1=Yes) 
Paid, inside 
house > 0 
(1=Yes) 
Paid, outside 
house > 0 
(1=Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: HLATE, DD (Reconstructed Score)         
Women 0.20 0.32 0.30 0.43 0.26 -0.09  
(0.23) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.26) (0.35) 
Men -0.24 0.23 0.26 -0.09 0.13 0.22  
(0.24) (0.26) (0.21) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) 
Difference 0.44 0.10 0.04 0.53 0.13 -0.31  
(0.37) (0.34) (0.35) (0.43) (0.33) (0.41) 
Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 9 
Observations 620 620 620 620 621 621 
Group means at Baseline (Within a Given Bandwidth) 
Women 0.95 0.82 0.54 0.55 0.41 0.43 
Men 0.65 0.36 0.14 0.65 0.48 0.67 
    
Panel B: Heterogeneous ITT, DD (Reconstructed Score)       
Women 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.09 -0.02  
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
Men -0.09 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.07  
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Difference 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.03 -0.09  
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Panel A presents second stage results. In both panels, each cell 
represents a treatment effect retrieved from a regression, which includes the group variable, an interaction term of the group variable with the 
training or assignment indicator, the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the relative score with the assignment 
variable as counterfactuals, as well as a constant. Difference is the coefficient of the interaction term with the group variable from the respective 
regression. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 11: SURVEY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA COMPARISION 
 
EF 
Verification 
Data 
EF 
Verification 
Data 
Survey 
Data 
EF  
Verification 
Data 
Survey 
Data 
Months  After Training 3 6 9-11 15 21-23 
2010      
IGA with Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) 79%1 - 62% - 57% 
2011 
     
Any IGA (1=Yes) - - 83% 72%4 - 
IGA with Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) - 80%2 57% - - 
2012 
     
Any IGA (1=Yes) - 91%3 73% - - 
IGA with Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) - 81%3 60% - - 
IGA with Earnings > 4600 NRs.  (1=Yes) - 67%3 46% - - 
Sources:      
1 EF Annual Report 2010, p2. 
2 EF Annual Report 2011, p5. 
3 EF Annual Report 2012, p4. 
4 EF Tracer Study 2013, p23. 
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APPENDIX  
A.  Reconstruction of Assignment Score and Threshold 
FIGURE A1: APPLICATION FORM 
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FIGURE A1: APPLICATION FORM (CONTINUED) 
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FIGURE A2: SAMPLE RANKING FORM 
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1 Jane Doe 1 12345678 28 Y Y 15 20 20 10 27 92 1 
2 Jane Doe 2 12345678 29 Y Y 15 20 20 10 25 90 2 
3 John Doe 1 12345678 26 Y Y 15 20 20 10 24 89 3 
4 Jane Doe 3 12345678 20 Y Y 15 20 20 0 30 85 4 
5 Jane Doe 4 12345678 21 Y Y 15 20 20 5 20 80 5 
6 John Doe 2 12345678 24 Y Y 15 15 20 5 25 80 6 
7 Jane Doe 5 12345678 19 Y Y 15 20 15 0 29 79 7 
8 Jane Doe 6 12345678 33 Y Y 15 15 25 10 13 78 8 
9 John Doe 3 12345678 17 Y Y 10 15 20 5 28 78 9 
10 Jane Doe 7 12345678 21 Y Y 15 20 15 5 22 77 10 
11 Jane Doe 8 12345678 27 Y Y 15 15 10 10 26 76 11 
12 John Doe 4 12345678 23 Y Y 15 20 10 10 20 75 12 
13 Jane Doe 9 12345678 18 Y Y 15 15 20 0 25 75 13 
14 Jane Doe 10 12345678 35 Y Y 15 15 20 0 23 73 14 
15 John Doe 5 12345678 19 Y Y 15 15 20 5 18 73 15 
16 Jane Doe 11 12345678 22 Y Y 15 0 20 10 27 72 16 
17 Jane Doe 12 12345678 30 Y Y 5 20 25 0 16 66 17 
18 John Doe 6 12345678 25 Y Y 15 10 20 5 15 65 18 
19 Jane Doe 13 12345678 24 Y Y 15 15 10 5 10 55 19 
20 John Doe 7 12345678 32 Y Y 15 15 10 5 6 51 20 
Notes: Red line indicates cut-off between accepted and rejected candidates. Candidates are sampled for the survey if their score is within a range of the cut-off score plus/minus 
20 percent. The shaded area represents candidates who would have been sampled for the baseline survey based on this example. 
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FIGURE A3: EFFECT SIZES BY DIFFERENT ABSOLUTE THRESHOLD VALUES  
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FIGURE A4: CROSS-VALIDATION FUNCTION FOR OUTCOMES IN LEVELS  
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FIGURE A5: CROSS-VALIDATION FUNCTION FOR DIFFERENCED OUTCOMES 
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TABLE A1: ORIGINAL AND RECONSTRUCTED SCORE COMPONENTS 
Sub-
Score 
Total 
weight 
Basis for  
evaluation 
Indicators Original 
Score 
  Reconstructed Score 
       Assigned 
Sub-Score 
  Assigned 
Sub-Score 
Source 
1 15% Trade-specific 
education 
requirement 
Compulsory prerequisite: All 
candidates must meet the 
minimum requirement for the 
training they applied to* 
 
15  
 
(0, 5 or 10 
in 
exceptional 
cases) 
  Integers of 
0 to 3 
Predicted 
2 20% 
 
Economic poverty Less than 3 months of food 
sufficiency 
20   4 Application 
form data  
 
 
Less than 6 months of food 
sufficiency or less than 3000 per 
capita family income from non-
farm based income 
15 
 
3 
 
     More than 6 months of food 
sufficiency and per capita family 
income from non-farm based 
income equal to or more than 
3000 
 
0 
 
0   
3 25% Social caste Women:  Dalit women or women 
from the following special 
groups: widows; internally 
displaced; ex-combatants; 
physically disabled; HIV-infected 
infected 
25   5 Application 
form data 
 
 
 
Women:  Economically poor 
women not referred to above  
20 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Men:  Dalit, Janjati, Madhesi 
men or men from the following 
special groups: internally 
displaced; ex-combatants; 
physically disabled; HIV-infected 
infected 
15 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Men:  Economically poor men 
not referred to above 
10 
 
2 
 
   
 
Neither of the above 
 
0 
 
0   
4 10% Development status 
of district of origin 
Least developed districts 10   2 Application 
form data 
  
Moderately developed districts 5 
 
1 
Developed districts 
 
0   0 
Preliminary score for short-listing (Sub – total) 70   14   
5 30% Interview  Commitment, Motivation, 
Attitude, Aptitude, Clear Vision 
for Employment and Enterprising 
 
0-30   0-6 Predicted 
Total score after interview 100   20   
Notes: *If candidates did not fulfill the course specific education prerequisites they were not eligible for short-listing and immediately rejected. In 
exceptional cases (approx. 9 percent of the sample) this criterion was not adhered to and instead applicants received 0, 5, or 10 points. When 
reconstructing this component, we therefore allow for integer values between 0 and 3. 
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TABLE A2: DEVELEOPMENT STATUS OF NEPAL DISTRICTS 
Developed 
District 
Moderately 
Developed 
District 
Least  
Developed  
District 
Kathmandu Makawanpur Ramechhap 
Chitwan Gulmi Parsa 
Jhapa Surkhet Rasuwa 
Bhaktapur Solukhumbu Kapilbastu 
Lalitpur Banke Bara 
Kaski Bhojpur Dadeldhura 
Dhankuta Gorkha Darchula 
Palpa Taplejung Siraha 
Syangja Bardiya Jajarkot 
Manang Kanchanpur Rukum 
Morang Nuwakot Sarlahi 
Illam Nawalparasi Baitadi 
Rupandehi Khotang Dailekh 
Sunsari Okhaldhunga Rolpa 
Kabhreplanchok Kailali Mahotari 
Tanahu Dolakha Doti 
Terhathum Arghakhanchi Dolpa 
Sankhuwasabha Udayapur Rautahat 
Mustang Dhading Jumla 
Parbat Salyan Kalikot 
Dang Dhanusa Bajura 
Lamjung Saptari Achham 
Panchthar Sindhipalchok Bajhang 
Baglung Sundhuli Humla 
Myagdi Pyuthan Mugu 
Source: Districts of Nepal, Indicators of Development. Updated 2003. CBS/Nepal, 
ICIMOD. December, 2003 
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TABLE A3: CORRELATION OF 5TH SUB-SCORE WITH OTHER SCORE COMPONENTS 
 Sub-Score 5 Sub-Score 5 Sub-Score 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Aggregated Sub-Scores 1 to 4 -0.220***                   
 (0.021)                      
Sub-Score 1 (Trade-specif. Edu.)          0.117*   2.752*** 
          (0.062)    (0.431)    
Sub-Score 2 (Econ. Poverty)          -0.182*** 1.046*   
          (0.029)    (0.551)    
Sub-Score 3 (Social Caste)          -0.348*** 1.013*** 
          (0.031)    (0.350)    
Sub-Score 4 (Development Status of Dist. Of Origin)          -0.473*** 3.560*** 
          (0.095)    (1.354)    
SS 1 x SS 2                   -0.120*** 
                   (0.039)    
SS 1 x SS 3                   -0.136*** 
                   (0.027)    
SS 1 x SS 4                   -0.379*** 
                   (0.101)    
SS 2 x SS 3                   -0.049    
                   (0.030)    
SS 2 x SS 4                   -0.194**  
                   (0.096)    
SS 3 x SS 4                   -0.278*** 
                   (0.087)    
SS 1 x SS 2 x SS 3                   0.006*** 
                   (0.002)    
SS 1 x SS 2 x SS 4                    0.019*** 
                   (0.007)    
SS 1 x SS 3 x SS 4                   0.026*** 
                   (0.006)    
SS 2 x SS 3 x SS 4                   0.013**  
                   (0.006)    
SS 1 x SS 2 x SS 3 x SS 4                   -0.001*** 
                   (0.000)    
N  4090     4090     4090    
Adj. R2  0.38     0.39     0.40    
Notes: All models include event dummies. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE A4: ATTRITION 
 Pooled Cohorts, 1st Follow-Up   2010 Cohort, 2nd Follow-Up 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
“Above Threshold” 0.008 0.017 0.007 0.016  -0.011 -0.047 -0.004 -0.052 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) 
 
(0.027
) 
(0.045) (0.029) (0.047) 
Female X “Above Threshold”  -0.020  -0.014   0.059  0.080 
  (0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
  
(0.066) 
 
(0.066) 
Female  
0.077**
* 
0.066**
* 
0.074**
* 
  -0.026 0.026 -0.019 
 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) 
  
(0.060) (0.035) (0.056) 
Age   
0.004**
* 
0.004**
* 
   0.007** 0.007** 
 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
   
(0.003) (0.003) 
Parent   -0.003 -0.003    -0.006 -0.009 
 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
   
(0.045) (0.045) 
Married   0.011 0.011    0.006 0.010 
 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
   
(0.043) (0.043) 
Dalit   -0.052** 
-
0.052** 
   -0.052 -0.053 
 
  (0.023) (0.023) 
   
(0.062) (0.062) 
Janjati   -0.014 -0.014    
0.109**
* 
0.110**
* 
 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
   
(0.032) (0.032) 
Any IGA at baseline   0.017 0.017    0.024 0.023 
 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
   
(0.027) (0.027) 
N 4585 4585 4585 4585  1547 1547 1547 1547 
Training provider dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  All models include district and training provider dummies. In Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) indicators are included which flag missing 
values for each of the control variables, respectively. All models are estimated based on the reconstructed score. The difference in sample size 
between the initial baseline sample and the sample we use in this analysis arises due to missing values in the variables that were necessary to 
reconstruct the score variable, which determines assignment. All standard errors are clustered at event level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5: BANDWIDTH SENSITIVITY 
 
Any IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Any non-
farm 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm 
wage 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Non-
farm self 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Trade-
specific 
IGA 
(1=Yes) 
Hours 
worked 
in past 
month Earnings 
Logged 
earnings 
Earnings 
> 3000 
NRs.  
(1=Yes) 
Earnings, 
condition
al on any 
IGA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: LATE, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
2 Index Scores 0.19 0.50** 0.35 0.14 0.43** 121.8*** 3387** 2.33 0.43** 3058 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.31) (0.27) (0.20) (42.98) (1341) (1.63) (0.21) (2254) 
Observations 2133 2133 1364 1364 2133 2133 2049 2049 2049 1012 
F-statistic 27.50 27.50 12.22 12.22 27.50 27.50 27.83 27.83 27.83 12.85 
3 Index Scores 0.13 0.38** 0.28 0.18 0.45*** 77.66** 2319** 1.52 0.34** 1722  
(0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (31.35) (1083) (1.27) (0.16) (1645) 
Observations 2874 2874 1862 1862 2874 2874 2759 2759 2759 1411 
F-statistic 36.18 36.18 20.31 20.31 36.18 36.18 37.95 37.95 37.95 17.43 
4 Index Scores 0.09 0.31** 0.15 0.25* 0.45*** 58.86** 1755** 1.26 0.24** 1258  
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (24.97) (872) (1.06) (0.12) (1097) 
Observations 3340 3340 2145 2145 3340 3340 3202 3202 3202 1622 
F-statistic 62.42 62.42 33.90 33.90 62.42 62.42 65.38 65.38 65.38 37.29 
5 Index Scores 0.07 0.29*** 0.10 0.25** 0.41*** 52.67** 1666** 1.29 0.24** 1393  
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (20.54) (744) (0.92) (0.10) (994) 
Observations 3685 3685 2391 2391 3685 3685 3530 3530 3530 1778 
F-statistic 77.89 77.89 42.88 42.88 77.89 77.89 79.88 79.88 79.88 42.02 
10 Index Scores 0.11 0.29*** 0.09 0.28** 0.41*** 45.13** 1685** 1.53* 0.28*** 1662  
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (20.99) (705) (0.89) (0.11) (1017) 
Observations 4000 4000 2604 2604 4000 4000 3834 3834 3834 1929 
F-statistic 83.98 83.98 51.84 51.84 83.98 83.98 82.98 82.98 82.98 38.61 
           
Panel B: ITT, DD (Reconstructed Score) 
2 Index Scores 0.06 0.15** 0.08 0.03 0.13** 36.23*** 1033*** 0.71 0.13** 885 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (12.15) (392) (0.51) (0.06) (602) 
3 Index Scores 0.03 0.11** 0.07 0.05 0.13*** 21.29** 662** 0.42 0.10** 455 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (8.66) (309) (0.38) (0.04) (437) 
4 Index Scores 0.03 0.10** 0.05 0.07* 0.15*** 18.97** 587** 0.42 0.08** 435 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (8.26) (295) (0.37) (0.04) (386) 
5 Index Scores 0.02 0.10*** 0.03 0.08** 0.14*** 17.88** 579** 0.45 0.09** 473 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (7.20) (264) (0.33) (0.04) (344) 
10 Index Scores 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.08** 0.13*** 14.11** 532** 0.49* 0.09*** 494 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (6.60) (223) (0.29) (0.03) (305) 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at event level reported in parentheses. Panel A presents second stage results. In both panels, each cell 
represents an estimate from a separate regression, which includes the total score, the relative score (forcing variable), and an interaction of the 
relative score with the assignment variable as counterfactuals, as well as a constant. Non-farm wage IGA and Non-farm self IGA are only available 
for 2011 and 2012 cohorts. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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B. Robustness Tests Based on Propensity Score Techniques 
We estimate: 
 
 =   +      !"# +  $  +  % +  &   (B1) 
 
Yit is the employment outcome of interest for individual i from training event j at time t; Treati is 
an indicator, equal to 1 for the treatment group and 0 for control; Ait is an indicator for the period 
when treatment occurs; $ captures program effects;  % captures the time effects, &, is an 
idiosyncratic error term, clustered by training event. After estimating a propensity score35, we 
derive the estimated treatment effect using two methods: “inverse propensity score weighting” 
(IPSW) and nearest neighbor matching (NN). In the IPSW method individuals are weighted 
according to the inverse of their estimated propensity to participate in the program. The weighted 
observations are then used in a DID regression. We present this method estimates under the IPSW 
specification in the Appendix B tables.36,37 The NN matching algorithm, in which each individual 
in the treatment group is compared to a fixed number of control observations (in our estimation 
we use four observations) with the closest propensity score. We present “NN specification” in 
Appendix B. Following Smith and Todd (2005), we estimate the difference-in-difference matching 
estimator for the training program effect  as follows:  
 
'( =

)*
∑ ,-./ − .01 −  ∑ 23-.3/ − .30 13∈5 678  (B2) 
 
98 is the number of treatment observations, the subscript denotes follow-up observations and  
denotes baseline observations; 2  is a matrix of weights. Weights for nearest-neighbor matching 
are computed by:  
 
                                                            
35 We employ various specifications, including the individual training score, the individual training score and demographic variables, the five 
subinterview scores and finally the demographic variables plus provider/district/cohort/city fixed effects. The results are stable across various 
specifications though we report the last specification based on demographic variables plus provider/district/cohort/city fixed effects because that 
specification yields the best overlap of treatment and control unit distributions in the common support area.   
36 We implement IPSW following Hirano et al. (2003). 
37 This particular weighting method, as opposed to matching approaches, has the nice property of including all the data (unless weights are set to 
0) and does not depend on random sampling, thus providing for replicability. We use a weighted least squares regression model, with weights of 
1/πˆ for the treatment group and 1/(1- πˆ) for the control group, where πˆ is the estimated propensity score from (2). Standard errors are clustered by 
training event. 
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23-.3/ − .301 =

:
∑ -.3/ − .301
:
3;
3∈<=
    (5) 
 
Ax is a set of   observations with the lowest values of >?@ − ?@3>. As in the two previous models 
outlined in this section, the dependent variable is the first difference of a given outcome between 
the baseline observation and the follow-up observation. We measure outcomes approximately one 
year after the start of training.38, 39 
Appendix Table B11 shows the ATT results on employment and earnings for the pooled 2010, 
2011 and 2012 cohorts based on the combined difference-in-difference and propensity score 
matching techniques. Unlike the RDD results, in this specification, we detect strong evidence of 
consistent impact on the employment rate across all specifications.40 All three models indicate a 
positive and significant effect, despite the high employment rate (i.e., 61 percent) at baseline. 
Restricting the employment to non-farm activities, we also find a significant increase: the rate of 
participation in non-farm income-generating activities increases by 21 percentage points (from a 
base of 29.6 percent). Translating the results in percentage change terms, we find that the program 
increased non-farm employments by 71 percent. These impacts are not only statistically significant 
but also economically meaningful. We detect strong program impacts, though smaller in impacts 
than revealed by the RDD approach, on monthly earnings. We observe a statistically significant 
(at the 1 percent level) increase in monthly earnings for the treatment group by 976 to 1099 NRs 
(≈ 14 USD), from a baseline average of 1272 NRs (≈ 17 USD).41 In percentage terms, this earnings 
increase translates to a 81 percent for the pooled sample. The impact on logged earnings is a little 
over 100 percent. The EF training program increased the “gainful employment” rate (i.e., the rate 
of new employment with earnings over 3000) increases by 16 to 17 percentage points, a result 
                                                            
38 Because the EF-sponsored training courses vary in length from 1 to 3 months, the follow-up survey examines outcomes 9 to 11 months after the 
end of the training. 
39 First, we address concerns about pre-existing differences and time-varying trends that could account for observed training effects when comparing 
trainees and non-trainees.39 Table B1 presents baseline participant characteristics (i.e., balancing tests) for a set of 38 demographic indicators. These 
tests are based on “ITT” comparisons of the treatment group (i.e., individuals whose scores qualify them for admission to an EF training event) and 
the control group. The baseline balance tests for the pooled sample (2010-2012) indicate that significant differences exist between treatment and 
control groups for baseline observable characteristics and pre-treatment outcome variables.39 Relative to rejected candidates, treated individuals are 
more likely to be Janajati and are less likely to have finished SLC (10th grade), characteristics which reflect the eligibility criteria and the EF”s 
differential pricing scheme for vulnerable groups.  Furthermore, the likelihood of treated individuals being engaged in non-farm and trade specific 
employment before take up of training was higher, as well as their working hours and ability to earn more than 3,000 NRs a month. These differences 
are consistent with training providers’ incentives to select candidates they think will perform best. Finally, individuals in the treatment group are 
also less likely to have control over savings and money of their own at baseline. To address these differences (and potential differences in 
unobservable characteristics) we applied a difference-in-difference approach in our analysis. However, growth in outcome variables and the may 
not follow a common trend, particularly when starting off at very different initial levels. Although it does not resolve the parallel trend assumption, 
we additionally applied propensity score weighting and matching techniques to achieve a higher degree of baseline comparability across groups.  
40 We measure employment by whether the respondent reported any income-generating activities in the past month or not.  
41 This average is based on the entire study cohort, including those with zero earnings at baseline.  The average earnings among those with non-
zero earnings were 2,928 NRs, translating to a percentage increase in earnings of 30 percent.  
72 
 
statistically significant across all three models. We also examine the trade-specific income 
generating activity (IGA) rate – the percent of individuals who find employment in the same trade 
as the training that they applied for – and we find impacts of 24 percentage points. The trade-
specific IGA impacts are larger than the non-farm employment impacts, suggesting that members 
of the control group, even when able to find employment, were less able than the treatment group 
to find employment in the trade in which they sought training. Based on the propensity score 
approach, we find that the EF program leads to persistent improvements in the underemployment 
rate (i.e., cases in which people are working fewer hours than they wish).  Table B11 shows that 
EF-sponsored training courses increased hours worked in IGAs for the pooled cohorts by 30-31 
hours per month (i.e., 44 percent). All three model specifications exhibit a statistically significant 
and positive impact.   
Table B12 shows results for program impact heterogeneity. The impacts of the skills training 
program differed markedly by type of trade for the pool 2010-2012 samples. Consistent and 
exactly aligned with the results based on the RDD approach, training in electronics, beautician, 
and tailoring consistently show strong ATT impacts on employment—graduates of these training 
programs are more likely to have employment in general and are also more likely to be working 
in the trade in which they were trained. Beautician training shows large impacts on both 
employment and earnings. We detect no significant impacts on employment or earnings outcomes 
for the remaining four trades. Results for food and hospitality (e.g., cooking and wait service) 
show no significant ATT impacts; results for construction show no significant impacts except for 
a marginal impact on trade-specific employment and on earning more than 3000 NRs per month. 
For the remaining three trades (i.e., poultry technician, handicrafts and farming), we detect some 
ATT impacts but they are not consistent across models. Overall, the results in Tables B12 reveal 
substantial heterogeneity in employment outcomes across the various types of training. The 
positive and significant impacts are driven almost entirely by three categories of trades: 
electronics, beautician training, and tailoring trades show positive and significant impacts on 
employment and earnings across both cohorts. We find no impacts for the food/hospitality and 
farming training. Construction-related trainings showed positive and significant impacts, but the 
effects are not consistent across outcomes.  
Finally, we show program impacts for men and women (shown in Table B13). To that end, 
Tables B13-B14 disaggregate the results to compare outcomes for men versus women, and for 
younger women (the “AGEI” population) versus older women. Corroborating the RDD findings, 
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Tables B13-B14 show the employment impacts are larger, almost double the magnitude for women 
than they are for men. The results for other economic outcomes, such as hours worked, earnings, 
and type of employment, are similar for both sexes. 
FIGURE B1: DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED PROPENSITY SCORES FOR 2010-2012 POOLED 
COHORTS (ITT) 
 
Notes: Propensity Score Distributions (Baseline ITT) 
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TABLE B1: BASELINE BALANCING TESTS 2010-2012 POOLED (ITT), FULL SAMPLE 
  Control Treatment Difference p-value N 
Demographics      
Female (%) 0.640 0.630 -0.010 0.610 4101 
AGEI (women aged 16-24)  (%) 0.319 0.336 0.017 0.350 4101 
Dalit (%) 0.090 0.077 -0.012 0.365 4037 
Janajati (%) 0.421 0.468 0.048** 0.024 4037 
Muslim (%) 0.017 0.025 0.008 0.269 4037 
Age  24.537 24.242 -0.294 0.249 4101 
Currently Married (%) 0.580 0.594 0.014 0.463 4101 
Any Children (%) 0.505 0.526 0.021 0.248 4101 
Completed SLC (10th grade) (%) 0.163 0.105 -0.059*** 0.000 4101 
Employment      
Any IGA in past month (%) 0.594 0.619 0.025 0.182 4101 
Any non-farm IGA in past month (%) 0.266 0.307 0.041** 0.012 4101 
Earnings in past month (NRs) 1201.970 1295.522 93.552 0.285 4069 
Earnings > 3000 in past month (%) 0.172 0.197 0.025* 0.094 4101 
Trade-specific IGA in past month (%) 0.154 0.189 0.035** 0.014 4101 
Hours worked past month 62.774 71.502 8.728*** 0.008 4101 
Empowerment      
Any savings (%) 0.585 0.604 0.019 0.311 4080 
Total Cash Savings (NRs) 3114.676 3177.379 62.703 0.832 4080 
Notes: This table reports average values for treatment and control groups, with p-value of a Student's t-test for equality of means between the two groups. 
The tests are conducted on the panel sample (those interviewed at baseline and follow-up). Standard errors are clustered by training course. “ITT” indicates 
that treatment is defined as having a score that qualifies the respondent for an EF training course.   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B2: TAKE-UP OF EF TRAINING (YEAR AFTER BASELINE SURVEY)  
  
Participated in an EF 
training course 
 Did not participate in an EF 
training course 
  Number Percent  Number Percent 
2010 Cohort (N=1372)      
 Assigned to Treatment (N=1040) 671 64.52%  369 35.48% 
 Assigned to Control (N=332) 
 
86 25.90%  246 74.10% 
2011 Cohort (N=1415)      
 Assigned to Treatment (N=1110) 826 74.41%  284 25.59% 
  
Assigned to Control (N=305) 
 
110 36.07%  195 63.93% 
2012 Cohort (N=1306)      
 Assigned to Treatment (N=889) 597 67.15%  292 32.85% 
 Assigned to Control (N=417) 127 30.46%  290 69.54% 
Notes: There are four individuals from the 2011 cohort and five individuals from 2010 whose status in the EF database is unknown. For these 
individuals, we rely on the respondent’s self-report of whether they took an EF training in the past year for the ATT results. The table only 
includes those individuals who were surveyed for the first follow-up. 
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TABLE B3: FIRST-STAGE PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATES 
Dependent variable: Treat (ITT) 
Age of applicant 0.000 
  (0.009) 
Sex of applicant (1=Female) 0.056 
  (0.094) 
Education level of applicant -0.010 
  (0.010) 
Education of household head -0.003 
  (0.006) 
Household size 0.007 
  (0.007) 
Married (1=Yes) -0.038 
  (0.074) 
Has child (1=Yes) 0.260** 
  (0.103) 
Number of children -0.079** 
  (0.039) 
Any IGA (1= Yes) 0.057 
  (0.072) 
Zero earnings (1=Yes) -0.075 
  (0.069) 
Janajati (1=Yes) 0.031 
  (0.443) 
Dalit (1=Yes) 0.436 
  (0.690) 
Muslim (1=Yes) 4.127*** 
  (0.357) 
Analytical Ability (0-5) -0.011 
  (0.019) 
Entrepreneurial score (0-32) -0.003 
  (0.004) 
Financial literacy (1=Yes) -0.047 
  (0.050) 
N 4449 
Pseudo R2 0.050 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered by training course. "Treat (ITT)" equals 1 if individual qualified for a training course and 
0 otherwise. Other independent variables (not shown): district and T&E provider fixed effects, training-type categories, quintiles of household 
wealth. All variables measured at baseline. Although baseline data were collected on 4,677 individuals, incomplete data on ethnicity reduces the 
number of observations to 4,449.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B4: EMPLOYMENT (ITT), 2010-2012 POOLED COHORTS 
  Baseline mean  OLS IPSW NN 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.612 0.071*** 0.093*** 0.070*** 
 [0.487] (0.022)    (0.022)    (0.020)    
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.296 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.150*** 
 [0.457] (0.023)    (0.024)    (0.021)    
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) 0.18 0.182*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 
 [0.384] (0.023)    (0.025)    (0.020)    
Hours worked in past month 69.261 18.740*** 21.130*** 19.014*** 
 [87.273] (3.890)    (4.148)    (3.940)    
Earnings 1271.542 856.087*** 921.323*** 850.880*** 
 [2197.669] (152.941)    (159.517)    (135.139)    
Logged earnings 3.291 0.957*** 1.209*** 0.975*** 
 [3.817] (0.191)    (0.203)    (0.173)    
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) 0.19 0.130*** 0.140*** 0.131*** 
 [0.393] (0.021)    (0.022)    (0.020)    
Clustered Standard Errors   Yes Yes No 
Notes: All columns report difference-in-difference estimates. "ITT" indicates that everyone whose score qualified them for a given training event is 
included in the "treatment" group.  
Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered at the event level where possible. Self-employment and location of work were not asked in 2010.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B5: EMPLOYMENT BY TRADE (ITT), 2010-2012 COHORTS 
  
Pooled 2010-2012 Cohorts  
IPSW Model (ITT Effects) 
 
any nonfarm 
IGA 
trade-
specific 
IGA 
monthly 
earnings 
(NRs) earnings > 3000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full Sample (pooled across all training types) 0.160*** 0.187*** 921.323*** 0.140*** 
 (0.024)    (0.025)    (159.517)    (0.022)         
Training: Farming (N=92) 0.155* -0.059 1167.151 0.081 
 (0.081) (0.104) (1000.983) (0.169) 
Training: Poultry Technician (N=41) 0.226 0.342*** 1139.704 0.189 
 (0.173) (0.099) (969.082) (0.145) 
     
Training: Food prep/Hospitality (N=265) -0.057 0.007 -965.418 -0.146 
 (0.096) (0.064) (1048.109) (0.095)      
Training: Electrician & Electronics (N=641) 0.187*** 0.258*** 1282.843*** 0.160*** 
 (0.044) (0.058) (359.255) (0.054)      
Training: Handicraft & Incense stick making (N=235) 0.107 0.207*** 967.311* 0.129 
 (0.082) (0.075) (524.717) (0.094)      
Training: Construction (N=1128) 0.067 0.100* 509.836 0.089** 
 (0.054) (0.058) (322.866) (0.038)      
Training: Beautician/Barber (N=239) 0.247*** 0.402*** 1529.259*** 0.241*** 
 (0.094) (0.089) (533.151) (0.078)      
Training: Weaving/Tailoring/Garment (N=1461) 0.249*** 0.222*** 1185.755*** 0.196*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (233.399) (0.035)      
Clustered standard errors (by event) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: No poultry technician trainings were included in the 2011 sample.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B7: EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES (ITT), BY GENDER, 2010-2012 POOLED COHORTS 
 
 
IPSW MODEL 
 
  Baseline mean for men  
Baseline mean for 
women  Men Women Difference  
   (1) (2) (3) 
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.774 0.518 0.025    0.130*** -0.106**  
 [0.418] [0.500] (0.035)    (0.028)    (0.045)    
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.471 0.195 0.105**  0.192*** -0.087*   
 [0.499] [0.396] (0.044)    (0.028)    (0.051)    
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) [0.499] [0.396] 0.147*** 0.209*** -0.062    
 0.295 0.113 (0.046)    (0.028)    (0.053)    
Hours worked in past month 107.772 46.887 11.564    26.287*** -14.723    
 [99.126] [70.525] (8.796)    (4.242)    (9.795)    
Total monthly earnings (NRs) 2137.947 774.683 681.698**  1036.088*** -354.390    
 [2539.479] [1796.025] (300.488)    (173.214)    (341.802)    
Logged earnings 4.796 2.428 0.281    1.688*** -1.407*** 
 [3.917] [3.476] (0.341)    (0.237)    (0.414)    
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) 0.350 0.098 0.091**  0.166*** -0.075    
 [0.477] [0.297] (0.039)    (0.027)    (0.047)    
Clustered Standard Errors    Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered at the event level where possible.  
Younger women (aged 16 to 24) compared to older women (age 25 to 35). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B8: EMPLOYMENT (ITT), DISAGGREGATED BY WOMEN, 2010-2012 COHORTS 
 
IPSW MODEL 
  
Baseline mean for 
young women  Baseline mean for women  Young women Older women Difference  
   (1) (2) (3) 
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.5 0.543 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.013    
 [0.500] [0.498] (0.040)    (0.041_ (0.058)    
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.168 0.225 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.009    
 [0.374] [0.418] (0.041)    (0.042) (0.062)    
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) 0.096 0.131 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.010    
 [0.295] [0.338] (0.036)    (0.039) (0.048)    
Hours worked in past month 39.569 55.560 25.348*** 27.881*** -2.533    
 [62.475] [78.058] (5.746)    (6.83) (9.259)    
Total monthly earnings (NRs) 560.537 1026.533 834.168*** 1283.426*** -449.259    
 [1438.980] [2113.341] (183.918)    (283.993) (320.888)    
Logged earnings 2.063 2.857 1.633*** 1.791*** -0.158    
 [3.264] [3.665] (0.329)    (0.366) (0.505)    
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  
(1=Yes) 
0.071 
0.131 0.144*** 0.192*** -0.048    
 [0.256] [0.337] (0.030)    (0.043) (0.051)    
Clustered Standard Errors    Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered at the event level where possible.  
Younger women (aged 16 to 24) compared to older women (age 25 to 35). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B9: BASELINE BALANCE TESTS 2010-2012 POOLED COHORTS (ATT) 
  Control Treatment Difference p-value N 
Demographics      
Female (%) 0.633 0.632 -0.000 0.994 4101 
AGEI (women aged 16-24)  (%) 0.333 0.331 -0.002 0.884 4101 
Dalit (%) 0.097 0.069 -0.027** 0.028 4037 
Janajati (%) 0.413 0.486 0.073*** 0.000 4037 
Muslim (%) 0.019 0.026 0.007* 0.062 4037 
Age  24.389 24.268 -0.121 0.593 4101 
Currently Married (%) 0.585 0.595 0.010 0.577 4101 
Any Children (%) 0.509 0.529 0.020 0.272 4101 
Completed SLC (10th grade) (%) 0.147 0.101 -0.046*** 0.000 4101 
Employment      
Any IGA in past month (%) 0.593 0.625 0.032* 0.082 4101 
Any non-farm IGA in past month (%) 0.283 0.306 0.023 0.142 4101 
Earnings in past month (NRs) 1258.539 1280.494 21.955 0.788 4069 
Earnings > 3000 in past month (%) 0.185 0.194 0.010 0.490 4101 
Trade-specific IGA in past month (%) 0.173 0.185 0.011 0.397 4101 
Hours worked past month 66.292 71.308 5.016 0.128 4101 
Empowerment      
Any savings (%) 0.580 0.612 0.032* 0.079 4080 
Total Cash Savings (NRs) 3246.505 3102.511 -143.994 0.608 4080 
Notes: This table reports average values for treatment and control groups, with p-value of a Student's t-test for equality of means between the two groups. The 
tests are conducted on the panel sample (those interviewed at baseline and follow-up). Standard errors are clustered by training course. “ITT” indicates that 
treatment is defined as having a score that qualifies the respondent for an EF training course.   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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TABLE B10: FIRST-STAGE PROPENSITY SCORES (ATT) 
Dependent variable: TREAT 
Age of applicant 0.001 
  (0.009) 
Sex of applicant (1=Female) 0.026 
  (0.086) 
Education level of applicant 0.005 
  (0.009) 
Education of hh head -0.001 
  (0.006) 
Household size 0.008 
  (0.006) 
Married (1=Yes) -0.055 
  (0.062) 
Has child (1=Yes) 0.291*** 
  (0.086) 
Number of children -0.113*** 
  (0.034) 
Any IGA (1= Yes) 0.117* 
  (0.069) 
Zero earnings (1=Yes) -0.034 
  (0.062) 
Janajati (1=Yes) 0.483 
  (0.661) 
Dalit (1=Yes) 0.146 
  (0.798) 
Muslim (1=Yes) 4.865*** 
  (0.370) 
Analytical Ability (0-5) 0.028 
  (0.018) 
Entrepreneurial score (0-32) -0.004 
  (0.004) 
Financial literacy (1=Yes) -0.053 
  (0.050) 
N 4490 
Pseudo R2 0.071 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered by training course. "Treat (ATT)" equals 1 if individual participated in a training 
course and 0 otherwise. Other independent variables (not shown): district and T&E provider fixed effects, training-type categories, 
quintiles of household wealth. All variables measured at baseline. Although baseline data were collected on 4,677 individuals, 
incomplete data on ethnicity reduces the number of observations to 4,449. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B11: EMPLOYMENT (ATT), 2010-2012 COHORTS  
  Baseline mean  
 
OLS IPSW NN 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.612 0.085*** 0.123*** 0.089*** 
 [0.487] (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.018)    
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.296 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 
 [0.457] (0.024)    (0.025)    (0.019)    
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) 0.18 0.244*** 0.233*** 0.243*** 
 [0.384] (0.024)    (0.024)    (0.017)    
Hours worked in past month 
69.261 29.581*** 31.545*** 30.484*** 
[87.273] (4.092)    (4.171)    (3.475)    
Earnings 1271.542 976.240*** 1099.759*** 1018.001*** 
 [2197.669] (135.081)    (131.653)    (119.605)    
Logged earnings 3.291 1.392*** 1.554*** 1.432*** 
 [3.817] (0.195)    (0.195)    (0.152)    
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) 
0.19 0.159*** 0.168*** 0.161*** 
[0.393] (0.022)    (0.021)    (0.018)    
Clustered Standard Errors   Yes Yes No 
Notes: All columns report difference-in-difference estimates. "ITT" indicates that everyone whose score qualified them for a given training event is included 
in the "treatment" group.  
Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered at the event level where possible.  
Self-employment and location of work were not asked in 2010.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B12: EMPLOYMENT 2010-2012 POOLED (ATT IPSW MODEL) 
 
any nonfarm 
IGA 
trade-
specific IGA 
monthly 
earnings 
(NRs) earnings > 3000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full Sample (pooled across all training types) 0.203*** 0.233*** 1099.759*** 0.168*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (131.653) (0.021) 
     
Training: Farming (N=92) 0.139** -0.044 529.452 0.081 
 (0.068) (0.083) (547.819) (0.094) 
Training: Poultry (N=41) 0.036*** 0.184* -707.959 -0.085** 
  (0.011) (0.110) (442.371) (0.040) 
     
Training: Food prep/Hospitality (N=265) 0.164 0.139* 1596.182*** 0.103 
 (0.139) (0.080) (581.698) (0.079) 
     
Training: Electrician & Electronics (N=641) 0.191*** 0.353*** 884.423** 0.140*** 
 (0.064) (0.054) (373.850) (0.047) 
     
Training: Handicraft & Incense stick making (N=235) 0.047 0.162** 1594.242*** 0.178** 
 (0.081) (0.073) (450.527) (0.073)      
Training: Construction (N=1128) 0.082** 0.079* 702.008** 0.099** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (298.111) (0.045) 
     
Training: Beautician/Barber (N=239) 0.459*** 0.501*** 1966.409*** 0.282*** 
 (0.108) (0.114) (402.549) (0.069) 
     
Training: Weaving/Tailoring/Garment Making (N=1461) 0.303*** 0.306*** 1272.605*** 0.235*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (180.795) (0.034) 
Clustered standard errors (by event) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: No poultry technician trainings were included in the 2011 or 2012 samples.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B13: EMPLOYMENT (ATT-IPSW MODEL), BY GENDER, 2010-2012 COHORTS 
  Baseline mean for men  Baseline mean for women  Men Women 
Difference 
between men 
and women 
 [Std Dev] [Std Dev] (1) (2) (3) 
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.774 0.518 0.091*** 0.143*** -0.051    
 [0.418] [0.500] (0.030)    (0.028)    (0.040)    
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.471 0.195 0.128*** 0.247*** -0.120**  
 [0.499] [0.396] (0.041)    (0.030)    (0.050)    
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) 0.295 0.113 0.170*** 0.269*** -0.098**  
 [0.456] [0.317] (0.038)    (0.030)    (0.048)    
Hours worked in past month 107.772 46.887 23.887*** 35.808*** -11.921    
 [99.126] [70.525] (7.103)    (4.758)    (8.147)    
Total monthly earnings (NRs) 2137.947 774.683 898.782*** 1185.170*** -286.387    
 [2539.479] [1796.025] (255.902)    (141.973)    (286.878)    
Logged earnings 4.796 2.428 0.582*   2.072*** -1.490*** 
 [3.917] [3.476] (0.300)    (0.236)    (0.377)    
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  (1=Yes) 0.350 0.098 0.115*** 0.197*** -0.081*   
 [0.477] [0.297] (0.035)    (0.025)    (0.042)    
Clustered Standard Errors    Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered at the event level where possible.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B14: EMPLOYMENT (ATT-IPSW MODEL), FOR WOMEN, 2010-2012 COHORTS 
  
Baseline mean for 
young women  Baseline mean for women  Young women Older women Difference  
 [Std Dev] [Std Dev] (1) (2) (3) 
Any IGA (1=Yes) 0.500 0.543 0.137*** 0.159*** -0.022    
 [0.500] [0.498] (0.039)    (0.037)    (0.051)    
Any non-farm IGA (1=Yes) 0.168 0.225 0.246*** 0.252*** -0.006    
 [0.374] [0.418] (0.039)    (0.041)    (0.052)    
Trade-specific IGA (1=Yes) 0.096 0.131 0.265*** 0.276*** -0.011    
 [0.295] [0.338] (0.036)    (0.037)    (0.042)    
Hours worked in past month 39.569 55.560 30.988*** 42.010*** -11.022    
 [62.475] [78.058] (6.019)    (7.538)    (9.525)    
Total monthly earnings (NRs) 560.537 1026.533 1063.272*** 1343.550*** -280.278    
 [1438.980] [2113.341] (172.773)    (218.104)    (263.357)    
Logged earnings 2.063 2.857 2.028*** 2.187*** -0.159    
 [3.264] [3.665] (0.301)    (0.325)    (0.406)    
Earnings > 3000 NRs.  
(1=Yes) 0.071 0.131 0.165*** 0.235*** -0.071*   
 [0.256] [0.337] (0.030)    (0.036)    (0.040)    
Clustered Standard Errors    Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in brackets) clustered at the event level where possible.  
Younger women (aged 16 to 24) compared to older women (age 25 to 35). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
